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ABSTRACT 
The transformation of South Africa from a pariah state to an accepted and admired 
member of the international community is widely considered a "miracle". Switzer-
land, like other western nations, pledged its moral and financial support towards the 
transition period which followed the first democratic elections in April 1994. The 
cordial relations between the two countries have, however, been overshadowed by the 
ongoing debate questioning Swiss-South African links during the apartheid era. 
This is a qualitative study which has as its main purpose the analysis i.e. description 
and explanation of Switzerland's relations with South Africa from 1994 to 2001. 
Although Switzerland's foreign policy towards South Africa will be the main focus of 
the thesis, the importance of the various state and non-state actors, as well as the 
various issues that have influenced these relations will also be highlighted. Swiss-
South African relations for the given period will be examined by viewing the domains 
of diplomacy, economy, development and culture. 
The major finding is that the Swiss government is constrained in its foreign policy 
decision-making by both domestic and foreign factors. Internally, the political 
institutions limit the executive powers of the federal government. Externally, the 
principles of neutrality and universality have provided the Swiss government with 
greater leeway within the international arena (economically and politically), but they 
have also evoked much criticism. 
Due to their firmly rooted adherence to neutrality and universality, the Swiss 
government and business community continued their ties with apartheid-South Africa, 
despite domestic and international criticism. A policy of discreet diplomacy was 
preferred above isolation. Present-day relations continue to be strong, but the Swiss 
government and business community should deal with their past, while South Africa 
must continue to seek workable solutions for its myriad of problems in order to ensure 
that Swiss interest remains focused on the country. 
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OPSOMMING 
Suid-Afrika se transformasie van 'n pariah staat tot 'n aanvaarbare en gewaardeerde lid 
van die intemasionale gemeenskap word algemeen as 'n "wonderwerk" beskou. Soos 
ander westerse nasies, het Switserland ook morele en finansiele ondersteuning vir die 
oorgangsfase na die eerste demokratiese verkiesing in April 1994 belowe. Die 
vriendelike betrekkinge tussen die twee lande word egter oorskadu deur die 
voortslepende debat random Switserse en Suid-Afrikaanse betrekkinge tydens die 
apartheid era. 
Die navorsing wat ondemeem word in hierdie studie is van 'n kwalitatiewe aard. Die 
hoofdoel is om die betrekkinge tussen Switserland en Suid-Afrika tussen 1994 en 
2001 te analiseer, d.w.s. te beskryf en te verduidelik. Alhoewel die fokus hoofsaaklik 
op Switserse buitelandse beleid ten opsigte van Suid-Afrika is, sal daar ook kennis 
geneem word van die verskeie staat en nie-staat ralspelers, asook die verskeie 
kwessies wat 'n invloed op hierdie betrekkinge het. Switserse-Suid-Afrikaanse 
betrekkinge vir die gegewe periode sal bestudeer word deur te kyk na die 
diplomatieke, ekonomiese, ontwikkelings- en kulturele terreine. 
Die hoofbevinding is dat die Switserse regering se besluitneming t.o.v. buitelandse 
beleid beperk word deur inteme en eksteme faktore. Intern, beperk die politieke 
instellings die uitvoerende mag van die federale regering. Ekstem, het die beginsels 
van neutraliteit en universaliteit die Switserse regering met 'n grater mate van 
beweegruimte binne die intemasionale arena gelaat (ekonomies en polities), maar dit 
het ook emstige kritiek uitgelok. 
As gevolg van sy diep geankerde neutraliteit en universaliteit, het die Switserse 
regering en sakegemeenskap hul bande met apartheid-Suid-Afrika behou, ten spyte 
van plaaslike en intemasionale kritiek. 'n Beleid van diskrete diplomasie is verkies bo 
isolasie. Huidige betrekkinge is baie goed, maar die Switserse regering en sake-
gemeenskap behoort verantwoordelikheid te neem vir hulle handelinge in die verlede, 
terwyl Suid-Afrika voort moet gaan om werkbare oplossings te vind vir die talryke 
prableme, ten einde die belangstelling van Switserland te behou. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
With the demise of the apartheid regime and rise of a new democratically elected 
government in South Africa, it was thought that the decades long, much-debated 
chapter of Swiss-South African relations would also be closed. However, the 
accusations of maintaining a "double morality" and "profiteering while human rights 
were being violated" continued to haunt the Swiss government and the Swiss business 
community as they came under renewed attack at the end of the 1990s for their 
alleged relations with apartheid-South Africa. What were these relations and to what 
extent did they have an effect on post-apartheid relations between the two countries? 
These are some of the questions that I will be pursuing in this thesis. 
Both the Swiss government and business community had faced similar accusations at 
the beginning of the 1990s when Swiss links with Nazi Germany were recalled fifty 
years after the Second World War. These accusations and the subsequent reparation 
payments to holocaust victims were not only a painful admittance of past wrongdoing, 
but it also tarnished Switzerland's "clean" international image and questioned its 
integrity. As a result, Swiss society has become particularly sensitive that a renewed 
onslaught on the Swiss authorities and business community will again bring the 
country into international disrepute. 
Feeding the debate are the former anti-apartheid organizations in Switzerland that 
have once again been united into a solidarity movement, Kampagne fur Entschuldung 
und Entschiidigung im Siidlichen Afrika (KEESA) . The movement supports the calls 
of Jubilee South Africa for the cancellation of apartheid debt and the making of 
reparations to the victims of apartheid. Although South Africa has been a 
(controversial) theme on the Swiss political agenda for several decades, supporters of 
the latest debate contend that the Swiss authorities and business community should 
learn from their mistakes and not postpone dealing with and taking responsibility for 
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their past links with the apartheid government. Now is the opportune time for the truth 
to be revealed. 
Although it was Switzerland's strong political and business links with South Africa 
during the 1900s which have mainly been emphasised, it is noteworthy that the Swiss 
presence was already recorded in 1658 with the settling of the first Swiss citizen from 
Geneva in the Dutch Cape CJlony. This was to be the beginning of a steady flow of 
Swiss citizens who settled in South Africa. Today, South Africa hosts the largest 
Swiss community on the African continent totalling 9000 Swiss passport-holders. The 
Swiss settlers brought with them various skills and professions, in particular the Swiss 
Mission. The important role of the Swiss Mission should not be underestimated, as it 
did not only engage in purely evangelical activities, but also initiated social projects 
such as schools, hospitals and clinics. The Swiss Mission was also to become 
instrumental in the struggle against apartheid by highlighting the injustices of the 
regime's discriminatory policies in Switzerland (Schweizer Monatshefte, February 
2000: 9-10). 
Swiss economic relations with South Africa can be traced back to the 1800s with the 
founding of the Friendship, Commerce and Reciprocal Establishment in 1885. The 
purpose of the agreement was to " ... accroitre par tous les moyens a leur disposition 
les relations commercial es entre leurs ci to yens respectifs ... " [". . . increase by all 
means available the commercial relations between their respective citizens ... "]. In the 
13 articles and additional protocol enclosed in the treaty, both governments agreed on 
and stipulated the legal, commercial and diplomatic tenets that were to underpin and 
steer relations . Emphasis was specifically placed on the citizens of the respective 
countries who were provided with the same rights as local citizens in terms of 
freedom of movement, speech, ownership and trade 1l. 
Switzerland established its first diplomatic relations in 1888 with the then Boer 
Republic of Transvaal when it opened an Honorary Consulate in Pretoria. This 
Honorary Consulate was moved to Johannesburg in 1895. A second Consulate was 
Il Swiss Federal Archives : Traite d'amitie, d'etablissement et de commerce entre la Suisse et la 
Republique sud-africaine (6 November 1885). 
2 
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established in Cape Town in 1916. In 1952 Switzerland took up full diplomatic 
relations with the Union of South Africa and later with the Republic of South Africa2>. 
Switzerland opened an embassy in Pretoria in 1960 and Ambassador Franz Kappeler 
became the first Swiss Ambassador to South Africa3>. 
Under the leadership of the National Party (the ruling party from 1948), the South 
African government commenced its adoption and implementation of the apartheid 
policies. As the outcry by the international world against these policies became more 
vocal and better organised, Switzerland came under strong criticism, since it did not 
adhere to the United Nations' calls for sanctions (with the exception of the weapons 
embargo which it enforced in 1963). Despite the UN declaring the apartheid regime as 
a "crime against humanity", the Swiss government continued to follow a foreign 
policy of discreet diplomacy based on neutrality and universality until the demise of 
the apartheid government. 
With the first democratic elections in 1994 when South Africans of all races were 
allowed to vote, apartheid was officially over. South Africa could finally shed its 
pariah status and take its righrful place within the international community. Like other 
western nation-states, the Swiss government also offered its moral and financial 
support for this fledging democracy in its period of transition and its formidable task 
of reconstructing the country. However, the allegations of close economic and 
military cooperation with the apartheid regime, have cast a shadow on present-day 
relations. Although the South African government has distanced itself from the 
debate, the Swiss authorities have taken several steps in an attempt to assess and 
clarify past connections. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Switzerland has often been viewed as a reference model for political stability. 
However, establishing this stability has been an arduous task, as the Swiss people 
have had to overcome a history of internal conflict caused by deep divisions along 
ZJ In 1961 Hendrik Verwoerd withdrew from the Commonwealth and declared South Africa a 
Republic. 
3l Archivbestande und parlamentarische Vorsttisse - Schweiz-Sildafrika 1948-1994, 2000: 262 . 
3 
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political, cultural and religious cleavages. Until today, there is no one ethnic affinity, 
language or religion holding the nation together. Instead, unity has been achieved 
through the strong will of the Swiss people towards self-governance within a 
democratic regime. Thus, Switzerland is referred to in German as a Willensnation. 
In maintaining international relations with other states, the Swiss government has to 
take into account these internal realities and guard against a foreign policy that could 
lead to tensions and divisions amongst the different cleavages of society within 
Switzerland. Crucial remits influencing foreign policy formulation include 
Switzerland's domestic federal institutions with special features such as direct 
democracy and consensus-seeking through a concordance government, as well as the 
hallmarks of Swiss foreign policy including neutrality, sovereignty and universality. 
A further significant formative force in Swiss foreign policy is the country's lack of 
raw materials and its heavy dependence on foreign trade. Few countries are so 
dependent on others or so integrated in the outside world4). Within the global 
economy, therefore, Switzerland is constantly seeking markets for its manufactured 
goods, while simultaneously securing a reliable supply and access to goods which it 
does not possess or possess in insufficient quantities. As interdependence renders the 
country extremely vulnerable during times of global recession and economic crises, 
Switzerland uses various international forums and platforms at its disposal in order to 
encourage progress towards a healthy world economy. 
The phenomenon of globalisation has also been fully exploited by the Swiss with the 
Swiss economy being closely linked to the world markets through foreign direct 
investments (FDI). Switzerland has historically been a major outward investor. 
Furgler (2000: 128) notes: 
On a per capita b2sis, [Switzerland] has the highest stock of outward 
investments per person of all OECD member countries reporting stock figures , 
and ranks seventh in terms of value of overseas investments. Swiss firms 
employ 1.4 million workers outside Switzerland, equivalent to roughly one-
third of the Swiss labour force and also similar to the number of foreigners 
4) "No less than 42 per cent of the gross national product is accounted for by services to foreign 
countries. In other words, almost half of the money earned comes from abroad'' (Frei, 1987: 8). 
4 
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living in Switzerland. During these last years, the jobs offered by Swiss firms 
abroad increased, whereas the number of persons employed in Switzerland has 
stagnated. Since the 1960s, Swiss FDI has increased dramatically, the stock of 
Swiss FDI being more than 12 times the amount registered in 19605). 
A few important Swiss multinational corporations (MNCs) have been the driving 
force in rooting Switzerland firmly in the global market and leading the way in Swiss 
outward investment. With major sales markets, as well as their major production 
located abroad, these MNCs can be labelled as being truly global. These firms have 
benefited from the advantages offered by cross-border production activities and 
international division of labour, as well as from the assets available throughout the 
corporate system. The ability of Swiss companies to compete in international markets 
successfully, has been vital in providing the competitive edge over their rivals6). On 
an ideological level, these companies and like-minded think tanks such as the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) have also played a leading role in uncritically propagating 
the advantages of globalisation and global competitiveness. 
In its relations with South Africa, commercial ties (note again the above-mentioned 
Friendship Treaty of 1885) were also to pave the way for diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. In its search for new markets, as well as reliable sources of 
raw materials, South Africa was initially viewed as a valuable partner on the African 
continent. With the emergence of the Cold War, the country was also regarded as a 
strategic ally in the fight against Communism. As will be seen in the following 
chapters, Swiss-South African relations were to mutually benefit both countries. 
The purpose of the study is to analyse - i.e. to describe and explain - Switzerland's 
relations with South Africa from 1994 to 2001. By describing and analysing these 
relations, the researcher wie seek to determine how Switzerland has acted towards 
and interacted with South Africa. In explaining these relations, an attempt will be 
5l Worldwide, Gabriel (2000:2) places Swiss companies 5 th behind the USA, UK, Japan and Germany, 
for FDI in foreign countries. He notes that the European Union remains the most important 
economic partner of Switzerland. 
6) The ranking of the Fortune 100 transnational corporations composite index oftransnationality 
shows that four Swiss firms are among the top ten: Nestle first, Holderbank third, ABB sixth and 
Roche tenth (Furgler, 2000: 128). 
5 
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made to identify the appropriate concepts and theoretical constructs with which to 
trace the link between domestic conditions within Switzerland and the nature of the 
relationship between Switzerland and South Africa. No attempt will be made to 
generalise these findings across the whole spectrum of Swiss foreign relations. 
Although Swiss-South African relations have received extensive attention and been 
the subject of in-depth research within the Swiss government, the media, academic 
and non-governmental circles, no South African researcher has previously undertaken 
a comprehensive study of the subject matter in question. This thesis is, therefore, an 
attempt to address the current lack of information in South Africa regarding Swiss-
South African relations. 
The following questions will also be considered as part of the research problem, as 
they contribute to providing a comprehensive analysis of the research subject. Given 
the fact that South Africa was increasingly being isolated by the international 
community due to its overtly racist policies: 
1. What role did the political regime (i.e. political institutions, laws, rules and 
regulations) of Switzerland play regarding foreign policy formulation? 
2. What are the important remits or conceptions that can be viewed as directing 
Swiss foreign policy? 
3. How did Switzerland's position in the world economy affect its position and 
foreign policy towards South Africa? 
4. What role did state and non-state actors play in the development of relations 
between Switzerland and South Africa? 
Furthermore, the relations between Switzerland and South Africa will be placed 
within a framework, so that the reader can connect and better understand the diverse 
phenomena of the interactic"1s between the two countries. The thesis also aims to 
show the reader some of the difficulties governments may face in positioning 
themselves within the international arena, as well as in implementing foreign policy. 
The reason that this study will concentrate primarily on the period 1994 to 2001 is 
two-fold: firstly, this time period marked the new beginnings for South Africa with 
the country being viewed by the international world as a political "miracle". 
6 
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Secondly, with the surfacing of the new debate concerning Switzerland's ties with 
South Africa during the apartheid era, several Swiss scholars are engaged in scientific 
research to ascertain the extent of Swiss-South African relations pre-1994. It would, 
therefore, have served little purpose to delve into the past given that these scholars 
have obtained access to documents held in the Swiss State Archives. 
1.3 CORE CONCEPTS AND THE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM 
As was already stated the problem statement, the research undertaken in this thesis 
will focus on the international relations between Switzerland and South Africa. The 
study will concentrate predominantly on Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa 
and the state actors who have been involved in developing relations between the two 
countries. Although the main emphasis will be on the international relations between 
two sovereign nation-states, it will also become clear as the thesis unfolds, that non-
state actors represented by pressure groups within the Swiss business community and 
civil society, played a significant role in their efforts to influence and guide Swiss 
government policies. 
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to draw a distinction between the central 
concepts "foreign policy", "international politics" and "international relations". 
Foreign policy making is deemed as the exclusive domain of the state and falls within 
the ambit of those bureaucracies responsible for pursuing the state's "national 
interest" within the context of the external environment. Essentially, foreign policy 
focuses on the strategies and actions of the state towards the external environment and 
the conditions (usually domestic) under which those strategies and actions are 
formulated (Holsti, 1983: 20). Wilkenfeld et al. (1980: 110) view foreign policy as 
"consisting of those official actions (and reactions) which sovereign states initiate (or 
receive and subsequently react to) for the purposes of altering or creating a condition 
(or problem) outside their territorial-sovereign boundaries." 
According to Deutsch (1988: 97) foreign policy is predominantly concerned with the 
preservation of a state's sovereignty and its physical security and secondly, with the 
maintenance and expansion of its economic interests. The concept "national interest" 
can, therefore, be viewed as being multi-dimensional with nation-states pursuing 
7 
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broad goals related to the acquisition of power, improving their economic strength 
and developing a strong ideology. It is, however, also a concept that has created much 
ambiguity as governments have used it to justify subjectively defined politices (Papp, 
1984: 23-26). Holsti (1983: 19-20) succinctly describes the difference between 
foreign policy and international politics as " . . . roughly the difference between the 
objectives and actions (decisions and policies) of a state or states, and the interactions 
between two or more states". Both the studying of foreign policy formulation and 
international politics place the state as the main level of analysis, as the focus is 
mainly the political activities between states. 
By focusing on sovereign nation-states and v1ewmg "power politics" as a core 
concept, scholars of International Relations move within the realist realm which has 
been the dominant paradigm in contemporary thinking (Mansbach and Vasquez, 
1981 : 4-5). The realist paradigm consists of three fundamental assumptions: 
1. Nation-states are the only actors who can exert significant influence in the 
international system; 
2. Political life is divided into "domestic" and "international" spheres. Domestic 
events can have no bearing on the international interactions of a state; 
3. The maximisation of power is the overriding interest of the state. 
The realist understanding of power underpins the above-mentioned assumptions. 
Nation-states are viewed as the dominant actors in international relations, as they are 
sovereign entities, able to muster the necessary resources to wield power. In domestic 
politics, the state is able to relegate non-state actors to a subordinate position. In the 
absence of a world government within the international arena, the anarchical 
environment forces nation-states to increase their power in order to survive. Young 
(1972: 126-127) further emphasises the dominance of the state-centric view by 
contending that international _iJolitics postulate the nation-state as the fundamental unit 
of world politics, nation-states are the recipients of the highest human loyalties, 
sovereign states are the only subjects of international law and international 
organizations are inclined to provide membership to states only. There is, therefore, 
no higher power than the sovereign nation-state. 
8 
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Although foreign policy focuses mainly on the state as the level of analysis, a study 
focusing on international relations would be incomplete without recognition being 
given to the effect of the international system, as well as the influence of non-state 
actors on the foreign policy process. International relations, as used in this study, 
refers to all forms of interaction between the members of separate societies, 
irrespective of whether they are initiated by the state. International relations would 
include the analysis of foreign policies and political processes between states, as well 
as international trade, tourism and communication. Leysens (1991: 21) contends that 
once trade is used by a government to achieve military or political goals (e.g. 
embargoes), scholars are no longer engaged solely in international relations, but have 
moved into the field of international politics. When focusing on international 
relations, the net needs to be cast wider to enable us to understand properly the 
complex relations between the various actors in the international system. 
In doing so, cognisance should be taken of the increasing challenge which 
International Relations (IR) scholars have shown towards the orthodoxies of the state-
centric view of world politics and each of its three fundamental assumptions. The 
question can be posed to what extent the picture projected by the state-centric 
world view gives an accurate reflection of the contemporary realities of world politics. 
This does not imply that nation-states are likely to become unimportant as actors in 
world politics. Furthermore, the conclusion has not been drawn that security no longer 
deserves a place on the agenda of issues. Instead, the decline of the Cold War and the 
emergence of a new agenda of issues pose complex questions which the old paradigm 
cannot answer adequately. 
The pluralist paradigm presents the world as a multi-centric, rather than state-centric 
system of relationships. Thus, a world perceived as constituting a complex network of 
many different actors and various issues. Various IR scholars have written widely in 
an attempt to show the shortcomings and weaknesses of the realist paradigm. The 
three fundamental assumptions have also been seriously questioned. Challenging the 
dominance of the nation-state within international relations, Keohane and Nye (1971: 
16-17) in their volume Transnational Relations and World Politics highlighted the 
"transnational behaviour" which is being displayed by actors such as multinational 
corporations. The authors argue that "[t]he difference . . . can be clarified most easily 
9 
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by focusing on the nature of the actors. The world politics paradigm attempts to 
transcend the "level of analysis" problem both by broadening the conception of actors 
to include transnational actors and by conceptually breaking down the "hard shell" of 
nation-state." Mansbach and Vasquez ( 1981: 7-8) agree with Keohane and Nye that 
not only do governments have competitors in the international realms, but also within 
the government itself; bureaucracies and individual officials may act independently or 
even compete with central decision makers. 
To challenge the second assumption which contends that political life is bifurcated 
into "domestic" and "international" spheres, Rosenau (1966: 63-71) employed the 
concept "penetrated political system" to give recognition to foreign actors who 
participate and often have an authoritative voice in domestic decision making. He 
contends that actors that could "penetrate" the jurisdiction of another nation-state 
included international organizations, other national societies or multinational 
corporations. In his contribution to the inter-paradigm debate, Burton (1985 : 51-52) 
argues that all foreign policy can be explained by domestic factors, an ultimate 
contradiction of realism. By maintaining that conflict within the international system 
is caused by the failings of the domestic system, the division between the international 
and domestic political spheres is questioned. 
The final assumption which holds that the struggle for power is the dominant issue in 
international relations, has also been challenged by scholars who identify many issue 
areas in world politics, and who argue that each issue area entails its own "logic" and 
"rules of the game". Power is not necessarily fungible across these different issue 
areas, so that military preponderance does not necessarily guarantee success in, say, a 
bid to stage the Olympic Games. Swiss foreign policy exemplifies this point very 
well, showing how a nation with limited military capability can still manage to punch 
above its weight in global financial matters, for instance. Rosenau (1966: 71-92) 
states that by maintaining the maximisation of power as the core issue in thinking 
about world politics, there is a failure to accommodate the multiplicity of values and 
stakes for which actors both cooperate and compete. Recognition of "issue-areas" is 
important as it can influence the functioning of a political system and the decision-
making processes. It is not within the scope of this thesis to present a comprehensive 
analysis of the inter-paradigm debate. The brief description should, however, provide 
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the reader with some of the different worldviews held within the discipline of 
International Relations. 
The purpose of the thesis, which is to undertake a descriptive and explanatory study 
of Swiss relations with South Africa, will be better served within the broader 
framework which the pluralist paradigm offers. Although security issues remain a 
dominant theme amongst foreign policy makers, there are other issues which also 
need to be considered. Furthermore, state actors are not the only actors who play a 
role in Switzerland's international relations with South Africa. The merits of using a 
pluralistic approach in the analysis of international relations lies in the fact that it 
allows for the consideration of multiple actors and various issues. The pluralist 
paradigm is well-suited to present a comprehensive picture of Swiss relations with 
South Africa, as scope is allowed for both official state initiatives, as well as the 
unofficial activities of non-state actors within the domains of diplomacy, economy, 
development cooperation and culture. 
Another important concept which needs to be clarified is "pressure groups" (also 
referred to as interest or lobLj groups) . Pressure groups describe organised groups of 
people who seek to influence political decisions. The term "pressure group" 
emphasises the manner in which such groups try to bring about social change, as it is 
by applying pressure that they enter the political domain (Willetts, 1982: 1). Pressure 
groups often constitute a legal entity in the form of a non-governmental organization 
(NGO). Commenting on the activities of NGOs, Hurrell (1995: 145-146) contends 
that such organizations have achieved notable success in shifting public and political 
attitudes and influencing political agendas. By publicising the nature and seriousness 
of the problem, disseminating scientific research and in organising and orchestrating 
pressure on states, companies and international organizations, NGOs have been able 
to place their issues high on the political agenda. 
Pressure groups, however, are not active m politics all the time. They focus on 
specific issues. Wallace (in Willetts, 1982: 22-24) places the emphasis on issue 
salience when viewing the actions of pressure groups, as these groups will attempt to 
influence outcomes on issues which are salient to them. Therefore, they become 
active when their specific interest is directly affected. Since pressure groups are not 
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usually part of the daily political agenda, they attempt to use political channels -
political parties and their members to execute their goals . Although pressure groups 
have traditionally been considered relevant to the study of domestic politics, Wallace 
maintains that these groups would exert pressure on any government in any country to 
ensure the desired outcome. The increased level of globalisation has also provided the 
infrastructure for increased social communication, thus connecting like-minded 
groups to organise across national boundaries. This emergence of a transnational civil 
society challenges the state-centredness of traditional or realist international theory, 
and is another reason why I opt for a more pluralistic approach in this thesis. 
The term "state actor" refers to all entities i.e. agencies and individuals (politicians, 
officials and personnel) that constitute the state apparatus. This is meant to include the 
legislative and executive branches (and their supporting departments) of the central 
government. In this study, relations between state actors and entities in a foreign 
nation-state will also be referred to as official international relations. 
A "non-state actor" refers to all organizations and individuals who are subject to the 
regulation of a central government, but are not in the service of the state. Entities such 
as multinational companies, cultural organizations, professional organizations and 
business organizations can be viewed as non-state actors. When non-state actors 
engage in activities that lie outside the system of which they are legally part, they are 
engaging in transnational relations. In this study, relations between non-state actors 
and entities in a foreign nation-state, will be referred to as unofficial international 
relations. 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
In accordance with the research aim of the thesis a qualitative approach will be 
followed in the collection and analysis of information, as well as the reporting on 
findings. The qualitative approach is especially suited to the demands of a descriptive 
and explanatory study. The purpose of this study is not only to describe and analyse 
the international relations between Switzerland and South Africa, but to inform the 
reader about the various state and non-state actors that have been active in influencing 
Swiss domestic and foreign policy. 
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The pnmary method of data collection was through interviews and written 
communiques with representatives of various state and non-state organizations who 
are actively involved in the different fields of Switzerland's international relations 
with South Africa. 
Interviews and written communiques were conducted with: 
• Diplomatic representatives from the South African Embassy in Berne 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Diplomatic representatives from the Swiss Embassy in Pretoria 
Representatives of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs 
Members of the Swiss parliament 
Members of the National Research Programme 42+ 
Representatives of the Swiss Arts Council, Pro Helvetia 
Researchers who specialise in Swiss foreign policy 
Members of the Swiss business community 
Members of the Kampagne fur Entschuldung und Entschadigung im 
Sudlichen Afrika (KEESA) 
Individuals who have engaged m initiatives to promote Swiss-South 
African relations 
The purpose of the interviews was twofold: firstly, the interviews were used to gather 
specific information on how the various state and non-state actors viewed Swiss-
South African relations in the various domains. Secondly, interviews were useful in 
providing greater background knowledge to the research topic and often led to the 
identification of additional sources of information. The one-to-one interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured way with a limited number of "probe questions" 
prepared beforehand. Respondents were, however, encouraged to describe their own 
experiences, to emphasise the salient issues as they saw them and to offer opinions 
where they deemed necessary. 
The merits of an interview is that "informants can provide historical information ... 
[while allowing] the researcher control over the line of questioning" (Cresswell, 1994: 
150). The disadvantage is that indirect information (the views of the interviewee) 
filters through (Cresswell, 1994: 150). As will be seen in the following chapters, the 
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Swiss government and business community had close links with the apartheid 
government and went against international and domestic calls to isolate South Africa. 
Despite the political and economic adversity that caused other companies to disinvest 
from South Africa throughout the past decades, Swiss companies opted to stay in 
South Africa and to increase their investments into the new democratic era. The writer 
made a concerted effort to interview a wide spectrum of state and non-state actors, in 
order to come to grips with the research topic . Interviews were also used to cross-
check information in order tc develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the 
relationship which certain persons had with the past government. 
In addition to the interviews, secondary data were collected, through the utilisation of 
documentary sources. These include library material (books and periodicals) from the 
Central Library of the University of Zurich, mass media articles and documentary 
material from the Swiss State Archives and the Archives of the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Due to a moratorium on later files , 1982 is the cut-off 
date for information gathered from the Archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
The search for additional information such as overviews and background information 
on the various state and non-state organizations, was conducted through the Internet. 
Overall, the writer had little difficulty in gaining access to relevant persons and 
documentary sources in Switzerland (the exception is the Friendship, Commerce and 
Reciprocal Treaty which took two months to locate). Although a substantial amount 
of work on the Swiss-South African theme has been written in English, the writer had 
to peruse numerous sources which were written in one of the official languages of 
Switzerland. This was a time-consuming task, as great care had to be taken to obtain 
an accurate synopsis of each reading. It should, however, be noted that the research in 
the following chapters provides but a cursory view of the complexity of the relations 
between Switzerland and South Africa. It is outside the scope of this study, to explore 
and expound every domain cumprehensively over several decades. 
1.5 OUTLINE 
The following structure will be used in the main body of the thesis. Chapter Two will 
focus on the nature of Swiss foreign policy and the interplay between domestic and 
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foreign politics. Chapter Three will describe how Switzerland conducted its foreign 
relations with South Africa during the apartheid era. The role of Swiss pressure 
groups during this period will also be viewed. In Chapter Four, Switzerland's official 
and unofficial relations with South Africa will be described for the period 1994 to 
2001. Relations will be viewed within the domains of diplomacy, economy, 
development cooperation and culture. Chapter Five will explore the renewed interest 
which Swiss pressure groups, members of parliament and the media have shown 
concerning the links of the Swiss government and business community with 
apartheid-South Africa. The study concludes by viewing and interpreting the findings 
from Chapters Two to Five and offering some suggestions for possible future 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
When discussing Swiss foreign policy, an understanding of Swiss domestic politics is 
essential, since it is often internal constraints that play a vital and directive role in the 
making of Swiss foreign pol~~y. Church (2000: 137) states" .. . Switzerland does not 
have a foreign policy, only domestic policy aimed at preventing external events from 
disturbing the internal balance and status quo." According to Gabriel, professor at the 
Centre for International Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
(Interview), an interesting dualism can be observed in Switzerland: economically, 
scientifically and culturally, the country is extremely interdependent internationally, 
however, simultaneously there is a great emphasis to remain independent. This 
worldview is also evident in Switzerland's foreign policy. As internationalists, the 
Swiss have been excellent globalizers and free traders, but reluctance to participate 
actively in international politics and join international organisations has rendered 
them isolationist and protectionist. 
Gabriel (1992: 1-2; 2000: 9) further explains that what is often called Sonderfall or 
"political uniqueness" is a useful concept underpinning the Swiss conviction that their 
domestic and foreign politics are unique in comparison with other countries. 
Domestically, this uniqueness can be found in the country's political institutions 
based on a strong federal system, while containing special features such as direct 
democracy that ultimately hold far-reaching implications for Swiss foreign policy. 
Sovereignty and neutrality, the hallmarks of Swiss foreign policy, are central to an 
understanding of Swiss foreign policy. Both concepts of sovereignty and neutrality 
are also closely tied to domestic politics. Gabriel concludes that the difficulty of 
Switzerland to adjust to a changing international world is, to a large extent, explained 
by this close interplay between domestic and foreign politics. 
The next section will focus broadly on the nature of Swiss foreign policy. It will be 
divided into three parts. Part one will give a cursory view of the actors influencing the 
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formulation of Swiss foreign policy. Part two will refer to the internal institutions that 
affect foreign policy decision-making. In part three, attention will be given to the 
Swiss conception of sovereignty and neutrality and how these components influence 
foreign policy. Throughout the chapter, emphasis will be placed on how internal and 
external politics are linked. 
2.2 SWISS FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 
The formative forces of Swiss foreign policy formulation are closely linked with 
Switzerland's position in Europe, the country's dependence on foreign trade and the 
interaction between domestic and foreign politics. The institutional framework 
responsible for foreign policy formulation consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (the main actors)7), the other federal 
departments8) and the Swiss parliament. The Swiss parliament or Federal Assembly 
plays an advisory role and ratifies the institutional framework for foreign policy 
formulation. In Switzerland, the local governments and cantons9\ as well as the public 
can also play an important role in foreign policy making. According to the 
constitution, the people have the final authority. Through a political system based on 
federalism and direct democ1dcy the cantons and the Swiss people have been able to 
influence foreign policy decisions (Gabriel, 1997: 171; Frei, 1987: 9, 12) 10). 
Gabriel (1998: 18-19) argues that in practice and especially during the last century, 
foreign policy formulation remained a secretive activity, dominated by a small elite 
group of politicians with close ties to the business community. Hughes (1962 : 33-34) 
commented four decades earlier that the Swiss democracy encouraged the rise of 
pressure groups and referred to the then Vorort which is today known as the 
Economiesuisse (the umbrella organisation for Swiss Industry and Trade) as the 
strongest "unofficial political force". The strength of the business sector is a result of 
7l See www.eda.admin.ch. 
S) All the federal departments are in fact engaged in foreign relations within their respective domains . 
For instance, during the debate on noise pollution caused by the aeroplanes flying over Germany to 
the Swiss international airport (Kloten) outside Zurich, it was the Minister of Transport who dealt 
with his counterpart in Germany. 
9l The political structure of Switzerland consists of the Confederation (the State), 26 Cantons and 
2873 Communes. 
JO) Swiss Embassy, Switzerland-State and Politics: 1993 . 
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the Swiss' dependence on trade. Switzerland's interdependence with the rest of the 
world was born out of necessity (lack of raw materials, sources of energy, food) and 
the Swiss business community played a crucial role in integrating Switzerland in the 
international community. As it was in the country's interest that a healthy world 
economy be maintained where Swiss businesses could operate unhindered, the 
influence of business on foreign policy formulation was significant (Frei, 1987: 7). 
Although parliament and the general public have means to monitor executive 
decisions, there are certain factors that restrict their contribution to foreign policy 
formulation. Firstly, a government based on consensus weakens the opposition 
considerably. Furthermore, in ruling by concordance (meaning joint consultation and 
decision-making, joint external representation and joint responsibility for the 
consequences of the decision), it is not uncommon for disagreement amongst Federal 
Councillors to lead to total stagnation when taking controversial policy decisions 
(Gabriel, 1997: 73; 2000: 5). 
Secondly, there are also various factors limiting the work of the parliament (Federal 
Assembly). Switzerland does not have a professional parliament, but a parliament 
based on a militia system. The Federal Assembly meets four times a year for sessions 
lasting three weeks. During these sessions, the primary functions of the two Chambers 
pertain to its legislative competences. Parliamentarians are to debate any amendments 
to the Constitution, decide on the enactment, amendment or rescinding of federal laws 
and take other generally binding decisions for the Confederation. The Federal 
Assembly also has certain international competences. The Chambers play an advisory 
role pertaining to foreign affairs bills. In this regard, it is especially the standing 
committees for Foreign Affairs for the respective chambers that can provide an 
important contribution. 
The composition of the committee and the appointment of the chairperson are based 
on the strength of the various parliamentary groups and also take into consideration 
language and religion. The main work of the parliamentary group meetings is to have 
preliminary discussions concerning Council business and to find consensus on 
proposals to be made during parliamentary debates. The meetings are held behind 
closed doors in order to allow council members to have an open discussion in a 
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protected environment and to facilitate consensus. As a rule, once consensus is 
reached in the standing committee, the Councils adopt the proposals. The committee 
can therefore, steer the political decisions taken on bills proposed by the Government. 
However, as Gabriel (2000: 5) points out, if the two Foreign Affairs Committees 
provide opposing proposals (as happened with the initiative regarding negotiations 
with the European Union) the political process can be paralysed. With the exception 
of competences which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Council, the 
Federal Assembly ratifies international treaties (Gabriel: 1997: 71) 11 l. 
Thirdly, the Swiss people have shown a dislike for a foreign policy which is too 
"active". They prefer a government that focuses on domestic affairs, to one with a 
focus on external issues. Given the realities present in domestic affairs, a policy of 
permanent neutrality has been favoured, since this is a means of keeping contentious 
issues at bay. Through referendums and initiatives, the public has often displayed a 
more conservative stance towards progressive foreign policy, severely impeding the 
government. For instance, in March 1986 the citizens could decide whether 
Switzerland should join the United Nations. Three quarters of the population voted 
against membership. It should also be mentioned that the opponents to progressive 
foreign policy decisions have often been more successful in bringing their message 
across and rallying the public behind them. Pressure groups can therefore to some 
extent affect the course of Swiss foreign policy (Frei, 1987: 12; Gabriel, 1997: 171 , 
2000: 4; Church, 2000: 147-148) 12). 
In the next section, the internal and external factors which affect Swiss foreign policy 
will be discussed. 
11 l Swiss Federal Chancellery: The Swiss Confederation - A brief guide 2002: 19, 21, 23 . 
See also http: //www.parlament.ch/poly/Framesets/E/Frame-E.htm for the powers of the Federal 
Assembly. 
12l Swiss Federal Chancellery: The Swiss Confederation - A brief guide 2002: 6. 
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2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC SWISS POLITICS 13l 
2.3.1 Federalism and Collegiality 
Switzerland became a federation consisting of 25 (later 26) cantons in 1848. There is 
much dividing the Swiss people given the heterogeneity of Swiss society. In 
recognising these vast differences, the Swiss constitution set out formal political 
institutions such as f ederalism and collegiality as a means to include and represent the 
country's different groupings. Although the cantons abandoned some of their 
sovereignty in 1848, the federal government was deliberately kept weak. There has 
also been a trend towards greater centralisation, but cantons continue to guard their 
autonomy jealously. Federalism is also reflected in the bicameral structure of the 
national legislature. In order to accommodate the cantons, there is not only a chamber 
representing the people numerically, namely the National Council, but also a "Council 
of States" in which all cantons are treated equally. Together the National Council and 
the Council of States constitute the Legislative authority (Gabriel, 2000: 10-11) 14). 
The shape of the executive is also distinct. The executive, a seven-member Federal 
Council, are elected by a joirt meeting of the two chambers for a period of four years. 
The seven members have equal rights and are meant to promote a unified front and to 
practice collegiality. The system discourages the emergence of a leading figure . There 
is no publicly elected president or appointment of a prime minister. Instead the 
council is presided over by a chairman called the President of the Confederation, a 
position that is rotated annually among the seven council members 15l. 
Although the executive are meant to govern jointly, members have been divided, 
resulting in tedious decision-making. The stability of the executive should not be 
equated with strength. In the area of foreign policy for example, it is important to note 
that unlike the United States, Britain, France or Germany, members of the executive 
do not enter government on a specific foreign policy platform. Furthermore, it is the 
13l See also Kobach, KW. 1993. The Ref erendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland. Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd: Hants. 
14) See: http://www.parlament.ch/poly/Framesets/E/Frame-E.htm for a description of the political 
structure of Switzerland. 
15l Swiss Embassy, Switzerland-State and Politics : 1993: 30. 
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public's view that the government's main function is to administer the country and 
not to decide the direction of policies. The latter should be the task of the people. This 
constraint holds serious foreign policy implications (Gabriel: Interview). 
2.3.2 Concordance 
In addition to the formal political institutions already cited, "unity in diversity" is 
further achieved through a system of Konkordanzdemokratie. This informal 
arrangement refers to the aistribution of chairs among the seven members of 
government. After 1848, the Radical Democrats (Liberals) dominated the Swiss 
government for nearly half a century. Since 1959, however, the composition of the 
Federal Council has been determined by a set formula based on proportional 
representation which has remained unchanged for the past forty years: two Radicals, 
two Social Democrats, two Christian Democrats and one member of the Swiss 
People's Party. Having all the important political parties represented in the 
government further enforces integration and the permanent striving for political 
compromise in parliamentary decision-making. The downside is that a situation can 
result in total stagnation when there is disagreement amongst the "governing four" 
(Gabriel, 1997: 73-83, 2000: \Linder, 2000: 101-102). 
The implication of concordance on foreign policy is that there is no real, coherent 
opposition in parliament. Frei (1987: 9) comments that the delicate balance that exists 
between the ruling parties can only continue if the internal equilibrium is spared the 
strain of sensational and adventurous foreign policy. An active foreign policy would 
inevitably result in the widening of differences and presumably soon mark the end of 
the "arrangement" between the parties. This system of consensus democracy, ruled by 
a permanently oversized coalition, is another feature of domestic politics that impedes 
foreign policy decision-making. 
2.3.3 Direct Democracy 
According to the Federal Constitution, the Swiss people are sovereign and ultimately 
the supreme political authority. The Swiss vote on all levels and on almost all issues 
through referendums and popular initiatives. The direct involvement of citizens in 
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political decisions is also viewed as crucial within the Swiss political culture. If the 
strong will for self-governance and independence unites the Swiss people, it is 
through the vote that political tension becomes evident. In a pluralistic society, direct 
democracy has the potential of becoming highly divisive, polarising the public and 
providing an outlet for populist rhetoric. 
Hughes (1962 : 33-34) maintains that the Swiss democracy is geared to pressure 
groups with the referendum giving them a further implied constitutional sanction. He 
further contends that it is a form of government calculated to call such pressure 
groups into existence and giving them power. Thus, any group whose capability to 
petition a referendum is taken seriously, automatically acquires a certain influence. 
Such groups will usually also be consulted in the informal negotiations which take 
place before parliament discusses the issue (Linder, 2000: 99-102). 
The most important link between external relations and domestic affairs is reflected in 
the Referendum on Federal Laws and Treaties with Foreign Powers. Article 89 of the 
Federal Constitution stipulates that accession to international organisations (e.g. 
NATO or the European Union) requires the sanctioning of the people and cantons in a 
referendum. Parliament can "lso submit other international treaties to referendum. If 
50,000 signatures are collected demanding a referendum, the proposed treaty must be 
put before the people for approval (Frei, 1987: 9, 12; Linder, 2000: 99-102). 
Williams (2000: 115) states that given the dependence of foreign policy on the 
decisions of a democratic citizenry, policy formulation can be a very frustrating 
exercise. The referendum acts as a "lever" by which the electorate can exert its 
influence on the conduct of foreign policy. The public vote has a rather conservative 
influence in the area of foreign affairs and tends to act as a "brake" on the shaping of 
progressive foreign policy. The basic attitude of the Swiss people even leans towards 
isolationism (Frei, 1987: 12; Gabriel, 151-152). Gabriel contends that direct 
democracy is the single most important factor explaining Switzerland's foreign policy 
dualism. 
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2.3.4 Kleinstaatlichkeit 
Kleinstaatlichkeit or "smallness" is another feature of Swiss political culture. The 
Swiss are extremely aware of being a small polity and regard this as very important. 
Gabriel (2000: 11-12) contends that "smallness" has a domestic and foreign 
dimension. Inside Switzerland there is a strong tradition of local identity and 
autonomy, while the foreign dimension has to do with the country's relative lack of 
power in the international arena. The Swiss are also sceptical of large political units. 
The rise and fall of world powers (e.g. the Soviet Empire) reinforce the Swiss 
conviction that large political entities are inherently unstable and bound to fail. From 
this perspective, they have assumed a wait-and-see attitude concerning the integration 
of Europe and there is still not sufficient proof that the integration process will be 
successful. 
The combination of federalism, collegiality, concordance, direct democracy and 
"smallness" constitute a political system the Swiss strongly identify with, consider to 
be unique and want to preserve. The Swiss are reluctant to change these institutions 
and they are extremely sensitive when they come under foreign pressure to do so. 
Actually, foreign policy is largely seen as an instrument useful to defend the Swiss 
political system against "imposed" political change from abroad, be it democratic 
superpowers or international organisations. 
2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY 
2.4.1 Sovereignty 
Over the centuries, and especially as a result of being surrounded by fascist powers 
during the Second World War, sovereignty is held in high esteem by the Swiss 
people. The Swiss tend to be very sensitive towards any infringements or diminishing 
of sovereignty. Instead of se.,:ng sovereignty as an instrument to preserve more basic 
values, such as individual freedoms, security and economic well-being, there is a 
tendency to regard it as an end in itself and to equate it with a maximum of political 
independence. Any diminution of sovereignty is seen as a loss of "national freedom". 
The idea of sharing sovereignty with others, a notion common in today' s Europe, is 
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unknown to most Swiss. They make no distinction, therefore, between a voluntary 
and an involuntary transfer of sovereignty (Gabriel, 1992: 4-5). 
2.4.2 Neutrality 
Neutrality, like sovereignty, 1s an important component of Swiss foreign policy. 
Through a policy of permanent neutrality, Switzerland hopes to establish 
predictability and stability in its relations with the rest of the international 
community. Neutrality has both an internal and external dimension. In Switzerland, a 
country consisting of several cultures, languages and religions, neutrality has always 
helped to guarantee internal cohesion. Thus, in the past, the principle of neutrality 
was also applied to conflicts within the Confederation. During the two world wars in 
the 20th century, siding with alliances would have precipitated a national crisis. In this 
case, external neutrality guaranteed internal cohesion. Today, neutrality is part of the 
Swiss tradition, history and consciousness of its citizens (Gabriel, 1992: 1-2, 2000: 12 
Williams, 2000: 113-114). 
Many ideas held by the public regarding neutrality were cemented during the Second 
World War when the country was surrounded by Germany. It was also during this 
period that a gap started to develop concerning the federal government and public's 
understanding of neutrality. It is important to draw a distinction between neutral law 
and neutral policy when viewing neutrality, since the former is rooted in a framework 
based on international law, while the latter refers to self-imposed or voluntary 
measures (Gabriel, 1992: 5-6). 
Switzerland gained the status of permanent neutrality during the Vienna Convention 
of 1815 and together with the constitutions of 1848 and 187 4, neutrality became a 
foreign policy norm for the Swiss authorities. Its permanent neutrality rests on the 
classical definition of neutrality under international law as codified in the Hagu,e 
Conventions on Rights and Duties of Neutral States of 1907. Thus, the conventions 
provided a legal framework allowing neutrals not to participate in war between other 
sovereign states. Neutrality is therefore a means of security for a neutral during war. 
Once under siege, the neutral is allowed to enter into an alliance. The Hague 
Conventions also grant neutrals certain rights and impose certain duties. For instance, 
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a neutral country could not support belligerent states with troupes and it had to 
prevent the misuse of its territory. Important to note is that neutrality law does not 
impede the right of neutral countries to engage in free trade with both sides during 
times of war (Gabriel, 1992: 4-5; Frei, 1987: 13-16; Williams, 2000: 113-114). 
The practising of neutral policy during times of peace was viewed by the Swiss as 
necessary to strengthen the country's credibility. Neutrality in this instance referred to 
self-imposed or voluntary measures taken at the discretion of the Swiss government. 
These measures included not entering into a military alliance, setting up its own army 
and non-participation in economic sanctions. Thus, the political dimension of 
neutrality became a maxim that could always be flexibly adapted to the circumstances 
and applied according to the interests of the country. Complementary to the principle 
of neutrality was the principle of universality in the conduct of Switzerland's foreign 
relations. This meant that Switzerland maintained official relations with all countries 
(recognised states and not governments), despite their internal political and economic 
systems (Frei, 1987: 13-16; Gabriel, 1990: 234-236). 
Swiss neutrality has also shown degrees of strictness or "purity". As a member of the 
League of Nations, Switzerland had been willing to participate in economic sanctions 
and to practice what was called "differential neutrality". However, with the outbreak 
of the Ethiopian war, all League members did not apply economic sanctions as 
agreed, and the Swiss government came to regret its decision to compromise integral 
neutrality. In 1938, with the eminence of Hitler increasing, Switzerland returned to 
integral neutrality. This meant that the country once again refrained from imposing 
economic sanctions. 
Although the government openly held to the stance of integral neutrality, it was 
economic interdependence and pressure from the Swiss business community that 
hindered their unilateral actions. The United States was later to exert pressure on 
Switzerland to participate s~cretly and informally in NATO's East-West embargo 
(Comcom sanctions). Thus, throughout the Cold War, the Swiss covertly participated 
in economic sanctions, while publicly claiming neutrality (Gabriel, 1990: 236-241; 
1998: 6-7, 15-18, 2000: 6-7). 
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Four features which are related to neutrality and which affect foreign policy will be 
viewed briefly. 
2.4.2.1 Alliances 
The strict interpretation of neutrality and its lack of compatibility with multilateral 
alliances have deep roots in the Swiss political consciousness. As mentioned already, 
the Swiss adopted the position of permanent neutrality at the Congress of Vienna and 
promised not to enter into preventative alliances, unless it was being violated. In the 
moderate international system in the 19th century where wars were of a limited nature 
in time, intensity and scope, the Swiss policy of neutrality could be maintained. 
However, the 20th century saw the advent of total war and remaining aloof during 
times of war became more problematic for neutrals. Even though the Swiss 
government had engaged covertly in attempts to form preventative alliances during 
the Second World War, the Swiss public perceived permanent neutrality as excluding 
any type of military cooperation, thus resulting in the notion of dying as a neutral 
rather than surviving as an ally (Gabriel, 2000: 12). 
2.4.2.2 Abstention from economic sanctions 
Neutral law did not include any notion of economic sanctions during times of war. As 
long as neutral states treated belligerent states equally regarding the supplying of 
arms and ammunition, free trade could be continued unhindered. Keeping in line with 
this right, Switzerland voluntarily imposed the duty referred to as "courant normal". 
This meant that the volume of trade during times of war could not exceed pre-war 
levels. By this measure, the country also tried to avoid the accusation of "war-
profiteering". The "courant normal" applied equally to all warring parties. The Swiss 
went even fmiher by abstaining from economic sanctions during times of war and 
peace. This was another means of reinforcing its credibility in anticipation of future 
conflicts (Gabriel, 1990: 240-241, 1992: 6-7, 1998: 4-5; Frei, 1987: 13-16). 
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2.4.2.3 Anned neutrality 
Under the Hague Convention, neutral states had to ensure that their territory was not 
violated by the different states engaged in war. This meant that neutral countries had 
to maintain armed forces that could fulfil this duty. However, under international law, 
it was not expected of neutrals to win a war autonomously. In the case of Switzerland, 
it opted for the establishment of a large army based on universal conscription that 
could defend the country independently. Today, although the size of the armed forces 
has been reduced drastically, the idea of a militia army as an integral part of armed 
neutrality remains firmly rooted in the Swiss political culture (Frei, 1987: 30-32; 
Gabriel, 2000: 12). 
2.4.2.4 Good offices 
The policy of solidarity and availability as reflected in the provision of good offices is 
another feature closely linked to Swiss neutrality. The Swiss people, preferring an 
unobtrusive foreign policy, have also favoured this instrument of quiet diplomacy. 
The offering of good offices was especially significant when countries broke off 
diplomatic relations and a third country was needed to act as a custodian. 
Traditionally, such services called "protecting mandates" were bilateral and of a 
technical rather than a political nature, excluding mediation of the actual conflict. The 
Swiss government has been more cautious about acting as an international mediator, 
firstly because it did not have a successful track record in previous mediation efforts 
and secondly it recognised its "smallness" and lack of power to be an international 
peace broker. Furthermore, the provision of good offices also includes the willingness 
of Switzerland to use its territory for reconciliatory efforts. The perception is that 
neutral soil is more conducive to promoting peace and understanding and 
international reconciliation (Volkerversohnung) . The city of Geneva in particular, 
became an important site for diplomatic conferences. Many of the special agencies of 
the United Nations also have their headquarters in Geneva. Such services are rendered 
in support of the principle of availability to provide good offices. It should be noted 
that Switzerland did not withhold its good offices, even though its use was sometimes 
highly unconventional. 
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Finally, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has given a 
humanitarian dimension to the Swiss provision of good offices. It is a private 
organisation that protects military and civilian victims of war. The ICRC is a fully 
Swiss institution, with close ties to the Swiss government. The Swiss government 
finances part of the ICRC budget and senior positions in the institution are normally 
filled by high-level federal government members. Neutrality is also mentioned as part 
of the ICRC's operating principles. The organisation is therefore viewed by many as 
practising "active neutrality" in world politics (Frei, 1987: 28-30; Gabriel, 1992: 7-8, 
2000: 13-14; Williams, 2000: 116-117). 
2.5 SUMMARY 
Switzerland is a country with a highly educated, multicultural population and an 
extremely interdependent economy, yet it has experienced great difficulty adapting to 
the changes in the international political environment. This can largely be explained 
by the country's unique political culture. As can be seen in the explanation above, the 
nature of Swiss foreign policy is influenced by both internal and external factors. 
With the end of the Cold War, however, Swiss institutions are under renewed 
pressure. Both components of foreign policy, sovereignty and neutrality, have come 
under the spotlight. It is clear that in a poly-centric world, the international position 
which Switzerland held of "going it alone" can no longer be maintained. 
In addressing this challenge, the Federal Council's 1993 Foreign policy report was an 
initial step towards redefining basic concepts. Sovereign independence was no longer 
the undisputed goal of Swiss foreign policy and the importance of neutrality has been 
reduced. Instead, the new goals include peace and security, economic well-being, 
democracy and human rights, social justice and ecological balance. These goals were 
again reiterated in the Foreign Policy Report 2000 16>. 
16
> See: http: //www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home/recent/rep/forpol.html for the Swiss Policy Report 2000. 
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Chapter Three will examine how the Swiss government applied its foreign policy of 
neutrality and universality towards South Africa during the apartheid era. The role 
Swiss pressure groups played in influencing bilateral relations between the countries 
will also be looked at. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SWITZERLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY 
TOW ARDS APARTHEID-SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a permanent neutral and adhering to the principle of universality, Switzerland 
continued its relations with South Africa throughout the apartheid era, despite 
vehement criticism domestically and from abroad. Addressing the members of the 
Swiss-South African Association in 1958, the former Swiss ambassador to the Union 
of South Africa, Dr F Kappeler, described Swiss-South African relations as 
"excellent." Letters and annual reports written by South Africa's representatives in 
Switzerland also confirmed that notwithstanding the actions of opposition groups 
within and outside the country, bilateral relations remained on a sound footing . 
We always had the impression that while the Swiss disagreed in certain respects 
with us, and clearly were sceptical of the long-term success of our policies, they 
were far from swallowing whole arguments of our opponents, were prepared to 
give us a chance, and regarded the matter as one in which no one had the right to 
meddle, least of all the United Nations (South African Embassy, Report 1963). 
Soos 1980 was 1981 'n goeie jaar vir Switserse-Suid-Afrikaanse verhoudings ten 
spyte van die optrede van die kant van verskillende anti-Suid-Afrikaanse 
organisasies. Daar was geen bilaterale probleme wat die verhoudings moontlik 
nadelig kon raak nie en het die Ambassade voortgegaan om kontakte uit te brei 
en die bande van vriendskap verder te versterk. [Like 1980, 1981 was a good 
year for Swiss-South African relations despite the actions of different anti-South 
African organisations. There were no bilateral problems that could affect the 
relations negatively and the Embassy continued to broaden contacts and to 
reinforce the friendship l (SA Embassy, Annual Review 1981). 
30 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2 SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS 
SPECIALISED AGENCIES 
As was already mentioned in the previous chapter, maintaining a position of perpetual 
neutrality became increasingly difficult in a postwar era characterised by polarisation 
and a newly found solidarity as manifested in the framework of the United Nations. 
However, at the time, Switzerland only had observer status in the UN General 
Assembly, as it viewed membership to the UN as incompatible with perpetual 
neutrality17). Although the country abstained from joining the UN, it collaborated 
actively in many UN specialised agencies, commissions and committees. Joining 
these organisations was permissible, since they were regarded as "technical" rather 
than "political" in nature (Frei, 1987: 36-37). 
It was also the UN that was to provide a major international forum for keeping the 
issue of South Africa under the attention of the international community. With the 
demise of colonialism and the emergence of a plethora of new states, the UN 
experienced a drastic expansion in the number of African members. Together with 
Asian countries, these newly independent states, sensitive about issues such as 
colonialism and racism, were fervent in their efforts to bring an end to what was 
regarded as the last vestige o " the colonial period on the African continent. Given the 
growing influence of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN and its specialised agencies, 
apartheid-South Africa remained on the agenda. Notable successes (see Table 3.1) 
were also achieved with the passing of resolutions isolating South Africa 
internationally and condemning its racial policies. South Africa' s opponents, 
however, could not manage to get the country's membership to the UN revoked 
(Geldenhuys, 1984: 206-208). 
17l The "Yes" vote for joining the United Nations was achieved on 3 March 2002. 55% of the voters favoured UN 
membership. It is , however, significant to note that the cantonal majority was only 12 to 11 . 
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Table 3.1 
Actions by the Afro-Asian bloc 
Through the persistence of the Afro-Asian bloc some notable successes were 
achieved in isolating South Africa. 
1960 - The recognition by the Security Council that apartheid could pose a threat to 
international peace 
1962 - The passing of a resolution calling for the implementation of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against South Africa and the formation of the United 
Nations Special Committee against Apartheid 
1963 - The adoption of a Security Council resolution calling for an arms embargo 
1974 - Prohibition of South Africa's participation in the activities of the General 
Assembly 
1977 - Imposition of a mandatory arms embargo by the Security Council 
Although Switzerland was not a member of the UN, it was also called upon to comply 
with UN resolutions regarding South Africa. The Swiss, however, citing their status 
of permanent neutrality, continued relations with South Africa. It was in the special 
agencies of the UN where Switzerland was to encounter difficulties, as these 
organisations provided a forum for the passing of motions and for debating actions 
against South Africa. Switzerland strongly disapproved of the tendency of many 
member states to bring purely political issues before the special agencies. In reaction, 
the Swiss delegation attempted to resist such tendencies or abstained from voting as a 
matter of principle, if resolutions were submitted on extraneous issues (Frei, 1997: 
37). In 1966, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Wahlen, made a special appeal 
to developing countries to confine their political problems to political forums (SA 
Embassy, Annual Review 1965). 
The year 1963, saw the beginning of a barrage of attacks against South Africa with 
the Afro-Asian bloc flexing its muscles in the International Labour Organisation and 
the Education Conference. In the South African Embassy's Annual Review of 1963, it 
is recorded that the actions in Geneva, although receiving negative reporting in the 
Swiss press, brought home to the Swiss a realisation of the strength in international 
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politics of the Afro-Asian bloc against a small state like South Africa, or for that 
matter Switzerland. At the conferences the Swiss tried to play a moderating role (for 
example, in 1966 the Swiss were helpful in working for a compromise to enable 
South Africa to retain its membership in the organisations, by excluding the country 
from the African region), but soon realised that it was within the power of the Afro-
Asian bloc to wreck all the specialised agencies in which they had a majority, if their 
wishes were not carried out. The events in Geneva highlighted in a very dramatic way 
the dilemma faced by every Western nation, viz. "for us or for South Africa". 
Not being a member of the UN, Switzerland regarded the specialised agencies as a 
useful platform in the international arena. Furthermore, Switzerland did not want to 
jeopardise its ties with the newly independent African states. In finding a solution to 
the challenge, Switzerland adapted its policy of neutrality to the prevailing 
circumstances. Swiss neutrality, having the country's national interest at its core, was 
to be used partially if Swiss national interest was at stake. 
3.3 THE STANCE OF THE SWISS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The imposition of the arms embargo, a matter that will be discussed later in this 
chapter, did not deter good relations between the two countries. As mentioned in the 
SA Annual Review of 1963, the South African government maintained its support 
among the powerful conservative-minded elements in Switzerland. Despite criticism 
voiced by the socialists and the socialist press, an official party stand against South 
Africa was never taken. Throughout the apartheid era, parliamentarians peppered the 
Federal Council with parliamentary questions concerning South Africa. Every year 
from 1963, except 1971, questions relating to various aspects of Swiss relations with 
South Africa were posed. Questions generally pertained to resolutions adopted by the 
UN, events that took place in South Africa (the student uprising of 1976-1977, the 
state of emergency of the 1980s) and to local events (the actions of the anti-Apartheid 
organisations and the Btihrle affair) . Questions were normally raised by 
parliamentarians left of the p01itical spectrum 18). 
IS) Archivbestiinde und parlamentarische Vorstosse - Schweiz-Si.idafrika 1948-1994, 2000: 21-22. 
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The Federal Council, preferring a policy of discrete or quiet diplomacy, was not 
willing to take an unequivocal stand against South Africa. In fact, the Swiss position 
throughout the apartheid era was that apartheid was a domestic matter and had to be 
dealt with by the South African government. It was only in 1963, when Switzerland 
imposed the arms embargo, that the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Wahlen, in 
his statement to parliament, included a short paragraph condemning South Africa' s 
racial policies (SA Embassy, Annual Review 1963). This was the first time that a 
Federal Councillor spoke out against South Africa in parliament. Ambassador August 
Lindt, heading the Swiss delegation to the UN Conference on Human Rights in 
Teheran in 1968, pronounced the first official moral condemnation of South Africa, 
describing its racial policies as a flagrant violation of human rights. In the Erklarung 
des Bundesrates of 22 September 1986, the Swiss government once again condemned 
apartheid and racial discrimination, as well as the violation of human rights. In the 
same declaration, the Swiss government called for the release of political prisoners, 
spoke against imposing economic sanctions, supported "positive measures" to help 
the disadvantaged people of South Africa and expressed their willingness to facilitate 
the dialogue between the South African government and representatives of the 
opposition 19). 
3.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY TOW ARDS 
SOUTH AFRICA 
In the next section, various aspects of Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa will 
be described. 
3.4.1 Arms Embargo 
In 1963, the Swiss government imposed an arms embargo on South Africa in response 
to the leaking of information to the press that the South African government had 
placed an order with Oerlikon for anti-aircraft batteries. The Swiss government was 
placed under tremendous pressure, internally and externally, to distance itself from 
South Africa and to adhere to the UN arms embargo. In answering the questions 
19l Archivbestande und parlamentarische Vorstosse - Schweiz-Stidafrika 1948-1994, 2000: 45-47. 
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posed by Communist and Socialist parliamentarians, the Swiss Foreign Minister, Dr 
Wahlen, declared categorically on 6 December 1963 that Switzerland would disallow 
the export of weapons to South Africa. The decision was based on the policy that 
weapons cannot be sold to countries where there is violence or the threat of violence. 
This sudden deterioration of bilateral relations was not anticipated by the South 
African authorities as it had sold Centurion tanks to the Federal Military Department 
as late as 1959 without much internal reaction. Furthermore, other Western nations 
normally allowed an order to be completed before breaking relations. Although not 
bound by UN resolutions, this reaction by the Swiss government did not bode well for 
the South African government. It was clear that the Swiss government could no longer 
act impartially when facing immense pressure and South Africa had to experience this 
first-hand with the arms embargo imposed on them (SA Embassy, 14 February 1964). 
The Btihrle affair of 1968 (the illegal sale of weapons to South Africa) and the order 
of Pilatus (PC-7) aeroplanes20l by the South African Defence Force in 1992, again 
unleashed a huge domestic and international protest. Once again the Federal Council 
was bombarded with parliamentary questions relating to the export of arms to South 
Africa and had to face accusations that the UN weapons embargo was being violated. 
The Swiss government, responding on the matter of the PC-7 planes, stated that these 
were excluded from the law concerning the export of war materials . Although the UN 
arms embargo against South Africa included aeroplanes, Switzerland as a non-
member was not bound by UN decisions. Under great pressure, and after negotiations 
with Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise from the African Nationalist Congress, the Swiss 
government confirmed that technical changes would be made so that the aeroplanes 
could not be modified into war planes and that delivery would only take place in 
August 1994, after the first democratic elections (Madorin, 2000:85-92). 
3.4.2 Economic Sanctions 
When the UN called for economic sanctions against South Africa, Switzerland did not 
comply. This issue was ofteu raised through motions in the Swiss Federal Assembly, 
20l The Swiss arms embargo did not include material manufactured under license outside the country or 
the PC-7 training aircraft (Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland-South Africa: 1999). 
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but the large majority agreed with the position of the Federal Council and rejected 
economic sanctions against South Africa. In its Declaration of 1986, the Federal 
Council explained that it did not view economic sanctions as an appropriate measure 
to bring about change. Furthermore, such drastic action could adversely affect the 
whole of southern Africa and create an economic crisis in the region. However, it is 
emphasised that this non-compliance was not to be seen as supporting the apartheid 
government. Gabriel (Interview) contends that Switzerland was especially sensitive 
towards foreign restrictions imposed by international organisations on economic and 
military matters. With Switzerland being so dependent on foreign trade, the Federal 
Council pursued an extremely cautious policy in the area of export controls involving 
"strategic goods". 
Against the value of large investments in South Africa and the lucrative trade with the 
country, the Swiss government acknowledged that it had to maintain its "world 
credibility" - neutrality is only valid if it is accepted as such by other nations. The 
Swiss government, therefore, decided to restrict capital exports to a ceiling of CHF 
250 million in 1974 (raised to CHF 300 million in 1980). In 1978, motions calling for 
the abolishment of the double taxation agreement and the export risk guarantee were 
not approved. 
After its declaration in 19f 5, the Federal Council also introduced the "statistical 
monitoring" of trade flows. In the mid-1980s at the height of calls for economic 
sanctions, motions dealt with by the Swiss government included the freezing of loans 
to the South African government and parastatals, the interruption of air traffic, a ban 
on the import of Krugerrands, the prohibition of sales of materials and patents in the 
area of nuclear technology and IT, and a ban on new investments and the importing of 
gold, diamonds, coal, iron, steel and agricultural products. All these motions were 
rejected. Instead, the application of the "courant normal" was maintained, that merely 
guaranteed that the Swiss could not be accused of profiteering from the situation and 
of serving as a platform for the circumvention of United Nations sanctions21 >. 
21l SA Embassy, 15 June 1979; Department of Foreign Affairs: Letter of Pik Botha 1979; 
Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland-South Africa: 1999. 
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The Swiss government also adhered to the principle of universality in trading with 
South Africa and did not dictate to Swiss banks or companies doing business in South 
Africa. Concerning the activities of three Swiss banks who purchased South African 
gold, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willy Spuhler, responded to a question by the 
Socialist parliamentarian, Didier Wyler, that the Federal Council was not prepared to 
dictate to the banks how they should operate in South Africa (SA Embassy, 14 
October 1969). 
Responding to another question by a Socialist parliamentarian, Hanna Sahlfeld, in 
1973 regarding a report by Centre Europe - Tiers Monde claiming that Swiss 
companies were engaged in Jiscriminatory practices by paying black employees less 
than white employees, and moreover below a subsistence wage, the Federal Council 
stated: 
Die schweizerischen Behorden vertreten den Grundsatz, dass die Angehorigen 
aller Rassen einander gleichgestellt sein sollten und dass in diesem Sinne die 
Rassenzugehorigkeit eines Menschen nicht zu <lessen Bevorteilung oder 
Benachteilung fiihren darf. [The Swiss authorities support the principle that 
members of all races should be regarded as equal and that the race of a person 
should not privilege or disadvantage him.] 
Die Bundesbehorden haben keine Moglichkeit, m emem Drittstaat 
schweizerischen Untemehmen sozialpolitische Richtlinien zu erteilen, da unsere 
Auslandsniederlassungen ausschliesslich der im Niederlassungsstaate geltende 
Gesetzgebung unterstehen. Sie geben indessen der Hoffnung Ausdruck, dass die 
Stidafrika niedergelassenen schweizerischen Untemehmen im Rahmen des 
ihnen zustehenden gesetzlichen Spielraums bemtiht sind dies 1m 
Gesamtinteresse der schweizerischen Wirtschaft und ihres intemationalen Rufs -
ihrer Arbeiterschaft die bestmoglichen sozialen Bedingungen einzuraumen und 
allenfalls noch vorhandene Benachteiligungen abzubauen. [The Federal 
authorities do not have the right to impose socio-political guidelines on Swiss 
firms operating in another country as this is exclusively a matter falling under 
national legislation. It is, however, hoped that the Swiss firms will endeavour 
within the framework of the existing legal leeway - in the joint interest of Swiss 
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business and their inte111ational standing- to provide the best possible social 
conditions for their employees and in any event reduce any shortcomings which 
may exist. ]22) 
3.4.3 Provision of Good Offices 
Switzerland also provided its good offices to South Africa. When diplomatic relations 
with Peru were terminated in 1985, Switzerland received the protecting mandate and 
performed the function of custodian (South African Yearbook, 1987-1988). In 1988, 
Switzerland also attempted through mediation to bring the apartheid regime and 
African National Congress (ANC) to the negotiation table. The mission was initiated 
in 1987 by the Cape Town based advocate, Richard Rosenthal23). In seeking a partner 
to aid the mission diplomatically and financially, Switzerland was suggested, since it 
was regarded as a neutral country with the ability to mediate in conflict situations. In 
addition, Switzerland had reasonable ties with both sides. Eventually, the mission did 
not succeed, partly because of a diplomatic blunder on the part of the Swiss Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Rene Felber when he agreed to meet PW Botha in Switzerland on 
14 October 1988. In December 1988, Switzerland made a second attempt to rescue 
the mission. Rosenthal was asked to give a letter to PW Botha, containing the 
proposal that the Swiss would finance a secret meeting on Swiss soil with the ANC 
before the end of January 1989. The ANC had given written consent that it would 
participate in such a meeting. Whether the letter came to PW Botha's attention is 
unknown, but on 17 January 1989, the President suffered a stroke, which was later 
given as the reason for his retirement from the political arena (SonntagsZeitung, 2 
May 1999). 
3.4.4 Positive Measures 
In the declaration of 22 September 1986, the Swiss embarked on a new policy 
regarding South Africa; namely applying "positive measures". The emphasis of these 
measures fell on human rights, education, the reintegration of refugees and returnees 
22J Archivbestande und parlamentarische Vorstosse - Schweiz-Siidafrika 1948-1994, 2000: 55 . 
23J See: Rosenthal, Richard. 1998. Mission Improbable: A piece of the South African St01y. David 
Philip Publishers: Cape Town. 
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and encouraging dialogue between South Africans with a view to democratisation. 
Funding totalling CHF 50 million was channelled exclusively through South African 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) also supported the efforts by the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa (IDASA) to facilitate a dialogue between members of the ANC and the South 
African business community. Funding was provided for two conferences in Dakar 
(July 1987) and Lausanne (November 1990). However, while maintaining normal 
relations with South Africa, the Swiss were also providing funding to encourage 
dialogue between opponents. This financial support had to be done in an extremely 
discreet way24l. 
The Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirche Schweiz (HEKS) was one of the private, 
church-based organisations used by the Swiss government to fund "positive 
measures" in South Africa. The involvement of HEKS in South Africa dates back to 
the 1970s when support was given to church organisations. Until 1992/1993 HEKS 
supported programmes together with church-based organisations and NGOs 
particularly in the areas of human rights and the social programmes for victims of 
apartheid. The two programmes funded by HEKS with a SDC mandate included study 
scholarships for Black and Coloured students and a repatriation programme for South 
Africans returning from exile. The former programme was especially intended to 
increase the numbers of the "non-white" elite in South Africa25l. 
3.5 THE INFLUENCE OF PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE PRINTED 
MEDIA 
3.5.1 Swiss-South African Association 
Throughout the apartheid years, the South African Embassy in Berne emphasised the 
valuable role of the Swiss-South African Association (SSAA) in countering 
allegations made against the policies of the South African government. According to 
the President of SSAA, Dr Anton Schrafl, the Association was founded in November 
24
> Interview with Ambassador Schaller: 6 April 2001; Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland-
South Africa: 1999; Swiss Embassy, Fact Sheet: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. 
25
> Das Siidafrika-Programm des HEKS, February 1998; Interdepartmental Working Group, 1999. 
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1956 by prominent leaders of Swiss corporations with business interests in South 
Africa. The founding members were the cement multinational, Holderbank, and the 
Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft (SBG) . The Association was to be economically 
oriented, but also had as an aim the fostering of links with the South African 
government (Schweizer Monatshefte, February 2000: 31-33). 
However, the historian David Gygax, in a book describing the history of the SSAA26\ 
maintains that the Association was a highly sophisticated instrument of the Swiss 
business and finance sectors. It was not only an Association promoting bilateral trade, 
but also became a means to explain publicly the point of view of Swiss firms who 
were operating in South Afr;ca (Gygax, 2001: 69-71, 258). Effectively, it became a 
justification for apartheid. Through its well-established network, the SSAA became a 
powerful lobby group in Switzerland and anchored itself firmly within South African 
business and political circles. The SA Embassy regarded the SSAA as particularly 
important, as it provided the widest possible forum in the Swiss business and financial 
worlds and "an ear" to the very influential Neue Zurcher Zeitung (SA Embassy, 8 
October 1965). 
The book highlights three points concerning the SSAA. Firstly, South Africa was 
regarded as an important country for economic reasons. With influential members 
representing corporations such as Schmidheiny, Schindler, Sulzer, Escher, Biihrle, 
Motor-Columbus, Holderbank, UBS, Roche, Nestle, Credit Suisse and Georg Fischer 
to name but a few, it became increasingly important to protect the vested business 
interests of Swiss corporations. South Africa also benefited from strong links with the 
Swiss business community. In pre-empting the visit of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Pierre Aubert, to Africa, representatives of the multinationals Brown Boveri, 
Ciba-Geigy, Hoffmann La Roche and Sulzer (all members of SSAA) advised the 
Minister to be cautious in making declarations concerning South Africa, in order to 
avoid jeopardising trade relations between the two countries27). 
26J See: Gygax, David. 2001. La S" 1iss-South Aji-ican Association (1956-2000) - Un organe helvetique 
en Afrique du Sud. Fribourg University, Fribourg. 
27l afrika-bulletin , February/March 2002; Die Wochenzeitung, 20 December 2002 ; SA Embassy, 5 
January 1979. 
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A second aspect of the activities of the SSAA is that it was engaged in parallel 
diplomacy. In official documents of the South African Embassy, it is mentioned time 
and again that South Africa could depend on the support of the SSAA. This support is 
evident in the comments and actions of the SSAA. At a time when the Swiss 
government maintained a distance from South Africa, the SSAA also played a vital 
role in receiving leading political figures in Switzerland and facilitating visits of 
politicians and newspaper editors to South Africa. 
The visits by prominent Swiss opinion makers were usually conducted in their private 
capacity. It is noted that Dr Pio Eggstein, the representative of Credit Suisse in South 
Africa (and a member of the SSAA) was particularly active in the area of unofficial 
visits between the two countries (SA Embassy, 12 May 1978). In an interview with Dr 
Eggstein, he remembered extending invitations to leading political figures in 
Switzerland. He was also able to communicate directly with the office of the South 
African prime minister. This parallel diplomacy reached a high point with the visits of 
the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan and President PW Botha during 1987 and 
1988 respectively28). 
The third aspect that reinforced the close ties between South Africa and the SSAA, 
was that the white population was viewed as being part of western civilisation and 
that the country was regarded as fighting against communism. Dr Kappeler in his 
speech to members of the SSAA in 1958 comments that his personal impressions of 
the white population were that "[he has] also been pleased to see how naturally and 
easily one can get acquainted with and understand South Africans and how much their 
mentality resembles ours in so many ways". Furthermore, he mentions that the 
country's " .. . intelligent and amiable Native population also contributes to the 
development by its work. They, in themselves, are rather conservative and passive 
and, apart from a few rare exceptions, will need more than only a generation before 
28) The Swiss-South African Association played a crucial role in facilitating these unofficial visits. All 
the ministers mentioned below addressed the SSAA during their visit to Switzerland: 
1965-Minister Connie Mulder 1979-Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha 
1985-Minister Owen Horwood 1986-Minister Frederik Willem (FW) de Klerk 
1987-Minister Magnus Malan 1988- State President Pieter Willem (PW) Botha, Minister Pik Botha 
1988- Minister Barend du Ples~.3 1990- State President FW de Klerk 
1991-Minister Dawie de Villiers 
1992-Minister Derek Keys 
1992-Minister Magnus Malan 
1993-Minister Pik Botha 
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they will be able to adapt themselves in their intellectual and cultural development to 
the requirements of a modern state". Madorin (Wochenzeitung, 20 December 2002) 
contends that apartheid was a civilisation project for leading representatives of Swiss 
business. 
3.5.2 Arbeitsgruppe Siidliches Afrika 
The Arbeitsgruppe sudliches Afrika (asa/9>, was politically the most influential group 
to support South Africa during the turbulent 1980s. Asa was founded by Christoph 
Blocher, a member of parliament for the Swiss People's Party and a rich industrialist. 
Blocher was also the president of asa until 1990. The committee of patrons of the 
study group included members of the National Council and Council of States. Asa 
articulated its aims as follows on the title page of its Bulletin: 30 l 
Arbeitsgruppe sildliches Afrika (asa] wurde im Sommer 1982 gegrtindet. Sie 
besteht aus Wissenschaftem, Politikem, Militiirs und Joumalisten und wird 
priisidiert von Nationalrat Dr. Christoph Blocher, Meilen. Als eine in jeder 
Beziehung unabhiingige schweizerische Organisation verfolgt sie das Ziel, die 
oft einseitige, teils ideologische motivierte Berichtstattung ilber das sildliche 
Afrika <lurch sachliche Hintergrundberichte zu ergiinzen und die Vortriige in 
dieser aufgrund ihres Rohstoffreichtums und ihrer Lage an der Kaproute 
strategisch iiusserst wichtigen Region in der Welt in grossere Zusammenhiinge 
zu bringen. [The Study Group for Southern Africa was founded in 1982. It 
consists of academics, politicians, military personnel and journalists and is 
presided over by the National Councillor Dr Christoph Blocher. As an 
independent Swiss organisation, their goal is to supplement the often biased, 
partly ideologically motivated reporting regarding southern Africa with 
background information and presentations, in order to place into context the 
importance of its wealth in raw materials and its strategic position along the 
Cape Route.] 
29) ASA was dissolved on 31 December 2001 . 
30) Bulletin: Arbeitsgruppe sudliches Aji-ika. Zollikon: Arbeitsgruppe siidliches Afrika asa, 1982. 
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Besides the publication of .~1e asa Bulletin, several semmars dealing with South 
Africa were also arranged where academics, politicians and other speakers were 
invited to participate. The position of asa during its formative years can be described 
as conservative, since it did not reject apartheid as a matter of principle. Instead, the 
study group came to represent the outlook of the white population in South Africa 
(Pfister, 2000: 6-7). 
3.5.3 Club of Friends of South Africa 
The Club of Friends of South Africa (CFS) was another useful channel for the South 
African government in countering the anti-apartheid organisations and even anti-
South Africa politicians. The CFS, founded in 1973, consisted of Swiss people who 
had returned to Switzerland after living in South Africa. These returnees did not agree 
with the manner in which South Africa was reflected through the anti-apartheid 
movement and the press and aimed at rectifying these "distorted" views based on non-
factual information. The Club was, therefore, established to contribute to a better 
understanding of the problems facing South Africa and its people. The CFS acted by 
attending meetings of the anti-apartheid organisations and responding with letters 
concerning incorrect media coverage (Interview with Haller). In documents of the 
South African Embassy, the CFS is described as an "ally". In countering the activities 
and the propaganda of the anti-apartheid organisations, the CFS members "infiltrate 
and participate in symposia on SA which in recent months have been held at various 
times by Protestant Churches."31 ) 
Members of the CFS also intervened when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre 
Aubert, commented on a question posed by the Appenzeller Zeitung, stating that if he 
had to choose between Black Africa and South Africa, he would choose the former 
(Appenzeller Zeitung, 9 December 1978). The Minister's comment was vehemently 
criticised by the Swiss press, since a Federal Councillor is not allowed to utter such 
personal opinions in public. The CFS responded by writing an open letter to Minister 
Aubert criticising his stance towards South Africa. On 11 January 1979, a press 
conference was held where tr~ Minister distanced himself from the allegation. 
3 1
> SA Embassy, 10 July 1973 ; 25 August 1981 ; 22 January 1982. 
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In the SA Embassy corresp01.Jence (16 January 1979) the Ambassador writes that: 
... die optrede van die Club 'n bewys is dat ons we] die kanale het om die 
Switsers te Jaat bont staan indien daar onverantwoordelikhede kwytgeraak word. 
[ ... the action of the Club is proof that we have the channels to put the Swiss on 
the spot, if irresponsible comments are made.] 
3.5.4 Anti-Apartheid Organisations 
The activities of the anti-apartheid organisations were a continuing theme in the 
correspondence of the South African Embassy during the apartheid era. Although the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) was not as strong as in the United Kingdom for 
example, it became a growing problem for the South African authorities given its 
efforts to influence the Swiss government and the Swiss public in general (See Table 
3.2). In the correspondence of the South African Embassy during 1973, it is noted that 
the cooperation of the World Council of Churches and the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
on the one hand and the Protestant and Catholic churches on the other hand, is a 
disconcerting new trend. "This is a comparatively new development which points to 
the mobilisation of forces against us and which is becoming increasingly difficult to 
counter." 
The AAM and the churches used every opportunity to criticise South Africa's policies 
in the form of letters, media releases, parliamentary questions, calling for boycotts of 
South African products, the closing of bank accounts with Swiss banks operating in 
South Africa and petitioning and public demonstrations. The South African Embassy 
(31 March 1978) expressed its concern at the tremendous damage caused by the anti-
apartheid organisations' determination to reach the broad masses, by hammering the 
ordinary people with anti-South Africa propaganda. 
Although the AAM was able to attract a few prominent personalities and wide media 
coverage to its cause, as well as increase official and public awareness of the plight of 
South Africans under the ap?rtheid regime, its successes were marginal. In response 
to questions posed concerning Swiss Joans to South Africa or the activities of Swiss 
businesses, the official Swiss position remained that of non-interference in the 
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economic sector. A petition containing 27 000 signatures was also handed over to the 
Swiss Parliament demanding the severing of ties with South Africa. The petition was 
defeated by 97 to 27 votes in the National Council, and led to Federal Councillor 
Aubert reconfirming that the universality of Swiss foreign policy also applied to 
South Africa (SA Embassy, September 1972, 15 June 1979). 
Table 3.2 
Incoherency of Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa - An example 
The Status of the Homelands 
During the parliamentary session from July to September 1976, a question was raised 
regarding the independence of the Transkei. The Swiss government responded that it 
would not recognise Transkei as an independent, sovereign state. This official 
position of non-recognition was also held towards Ciskei, Bophutatswana and Venda. 
However, in 1984 a bank loan of CHF 9,5 million was organised for the Transkei . In 
reaction to the letter of protest by Paul Rutishauser (President of the AAM), the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Aubert, stated that the Federal authorities could not 
act, since private credit is only granted from CHF 10 million. Aubert also reiterated 
that despite the loan, non-recognition of Transkei would continue. 
The matter of citizenship was also particularly problematic, as citizenship was 
prescribed by the South Afri~an authorities. From 1947, South Africans could travel 
to Switzerland without requiring a visa, their citizenship and a South African passport 
being recognised as valid for travelling. However, those persons living in homelands 
lost their South African citizenship and were issued with a "homeland's passport". 
For those travelling on a "homeland's passport" the Swiss authorities requested a visa, 
thus publicly distinguishing between citizens of South Africa and of the homelands. 
The contradiction highlighted by the anti-apartheid organisations was that citizens 
from homelands in fact needed visas, because they had no South African passports. 
However, "homeland ' s passports" were recognised, but not the homeland itself. To be 
consequent, these persons had to be seen as South Africans, thus not needing any visa. 
In such matters, anti-apartheid organisations were especially attentive to emphasise 
the incoherency of Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa (Richner, 2000: 25-28). 
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3.5.5 The Printed Media 
It is noteworthy that the South African Embassy described the Swiss media as 
sometimes critical, but generally factual and fair. Except for the socialist press that 
was consistently unfavourable and often very hostile towards South Africa and 
remained true to party lines, many influential newspapers like the Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung remained balanced in their reporting, calling for an understanding of South 
Africa' s problems. 
Events in South Africa, the actions of the AAM in Switzerland and the decisions 
taken against South Africa in the UN and its specialised agencies, kept the attention of 
the Swiss media focused on South Africa and thus in the minds of the Swiss people. 
As a non-member of the UN, the Swiss press showed little restraint in criticising the 
world organisation (SA Embassy, 18 May 1964). The mainstream press was also very 
supportive and strictly adhered to a policy of neutrality and non-interference in trade 
relations. Therefore, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Aubert, commented 
that if given the choice between black Africa and South Africa, he would choose 
black Africa, this was perceived as highly controversial and he was severely criticised 
by the press (Tages-Anzeiger, 12 January 1979; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 11 January 
1979; Zurichsee-Zeitung, 12 January 1979; Basler Zeitung, 12 January 1979; Journal 
de Geneve, 16 January 1979). 
The South African authorities, with the assistance of the SSAA, went to great lengths 
to nurture relations with editors of newspapers. These relations paid off in positive 
contributions by those Swiss who had visited South Africa. Prof Ropke of the 
University of Basel, Alfred Isler, managing editor of a leading financial publication, 
Dr Hoffmann of the Schaffhauser Nachrichten , Dr Fred Luchsinger, a chief editor and 
respected journalist and Dr Lang of Radio Berne, were a few of the media leaders 
who were in a position to place South Africa in a positive light (SA Embassy, 
Developments in Switzerland 1963; 12 May 1978). 
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3.6 SOUTH AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO BUILD A SYMPATHETIC CORE 
IN SWITZERLANil 
It has already been noted that the South African government could always depend on 
the conservative elements within the Swiss government. In a letter written in 1979 by 
the then South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, relations with 
Switzerland were described as being based on "nugtere pragmatisme" ["sober 
pragmatism"] and the country was viewed as '"n groot en invloedryke 
welwillendheidsbron" ["a great and influential source of goodwill"]. It is important to 
note, however, that the South African representatives in Switzerland were constantly 
building up a sympathetic core in the Swiss parliament and in the media. In doing so, 
their close ties with the Swiss business community through the SSAA, served as a 
useful platform. Close contacts were maintained with parliamentarians and editors 
and visits to South Africa were facilitated so that these opinion makers could get first 
hand experience of the country. 
The South African Embassy paid especially close attention to the appointments of 
Federal Councillors, evaluating each one as anti- or pro-South Africa. The position of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs was of particular interest. Taking into account the set 
formula of the Federal Council, the position of Minster of Foreign Affairs 
traditionally went to a Social Democrat during the Cold War era. Thus, Swiss foreign 
policy was shaped by the Social Democrats from 1961 to 1993 . Gabriel (Interview) 
states that the Social Democrats took a cautious stance towards apartheid. This is also 
clear from the SA Embassy documents (14 October 1969, 24 December 1969) which 
record that all the Federal Councillors responsible for Foreign Affairs held an 
unsympathetic stance towards South Africa32l. 
However, it is clear from SA Embassy correspondence that when companng the 
position of South Africa and the anti-apartheid organisations, the former had 
sufficient support inside the Swiss government and its ministries to withstand internal 
32) Friederich Traugott Wahlen 1961-1965 ; Willy Spuhler 1966-1970; Pierre Graber 1970-1978; Pierre 
Aubert 1978-1987; Rene Felber 1988-1993 . 
Since 1993, this position has been held by members of the Christian Democratic People 's Party. 
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and external attacks33 ). In his account of the pressure groups active in Switzerland 
during the apartheid era, Pfister (2000: 9-10) concludes that the pro-South Africa 
groups had access to better political channels to further their cause. In contrast, the 
AAM and other anti-South Africa groups, did not have the necessary political clout to 
influence Swiss foreign policy towards South Africa fundamentally. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
The guiding principles of Swiss foreign policy, namely neutrality and universality, 
meant that South Africa could count on the protection of an economically powerful 
nation like Switzerland. In addition, within the context of the Cold War, South Africa 
was not only viewed favourably for the vast business opportunities and economic 
advantages it had to offer, but also as an ally in the fight against communism. 
Ultimately, the Swiss government viewed the system of apartheid as a domestic South 
African issue. Although Switzerland came under great pressure, domestically and 
abroad, to dilute its relations with South Africa, this did not occur. On the contrary, 
relations were strengthened during this period. Although the Swiss government 
condemned apartheid on moral grounds, the means with which to bring about change 
in South Africa was questioned. In line with the general public view that foreign 
policy should be unobtrusive, the Swiss government's foreign policy towards South 
Africa was characterised by discreetness. 
However, as will be seen in Chapter Five, Swiss-South African relations were again 
placed on the Swiss political agenda towards the end of the 1990s. Former anti-
apartheid organisations joined forces and gained political support amongst green-red 
parliamentarians, as well as the Swiss media, in a call on the Swiss government and 
Swiss business community to re-examine past links with the apartheid government. It 
is clear that the contentious foreign policy of "silent diplomacy" and "courant normal" 
pursued during the apartheid era, has returned to haunt the Swiss government. 
33 ) SA Embassy, 8 October 1965 ; 10 March 1971 ; 16 February 1979; 25 August 1981 ; 6 November 
1981. 
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In Chapter Four, the relations between Switzerland and South Africa from 1994 to 
2001 will be described. Vari()US state and non-state actors, who have contributed to 
the development and strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries in 
the transitional years after the first democratic elections, are identified and described. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SWISS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA: 1994 - 2001 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was noted in Chapter Three, that Switzerland did not sever its official ties with 
South Africa during the apartheid era. These ties date back to 1952 when Switzerland 
opened an embassy in Pretoria first taking up diplomatic relations with the Union of 
South Africa and later the Republic of South Africa. Although the international 
community and domestic anti-apartheid organisations strongly disapproved of the 
close ties between Switzerland and South Africa, the Swiss government was not 
deterred from following its foreign policy of neutrality and universality. In addition, 
the significance of the close economic interaction between the two countries should 
also be noted. As was emphasised in the previous chapter, the Swiss business 
community led by certain major Swiss corporations and business leaders, was highly 
influential in guiding relations with South Africa. 
Swiss-South African relations were to enter a new phase with the birth of the 
democratic South Africa in 1994. As emphasised by Ambassador Schaller (Interview) 
South Africa was Switzerland's most important trading partner in Africa during the 
apartheid years, a position which the country still holds today. Furthermore, 
expectations remain that a pr()sperous South Africa will play a leading role regarding 
the social and economic development of the African continent. The Swiss 
government, however, recognised that the dismantling of the apartheid system and the 
laying of a foundation for a true democracy, as well as addressing the multitude of 
social problems, would pose immense challenges to the new South African 
government. Switzerland, therefore, showed its willingness to strengthen bilateral 
relations by pledging its moral and financial support and to assist South Africa 
through its period of transition (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 5 August 1998). 
In this chapter, Swiss-South African relations from 1994 to 2001 will be described 
and analysed by focusing on both official and unofficial relations within the domains 
of diplomacy, economy, development cooperation and culture. The aim of this chapter 
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is not to provide an exhaustive study concemmg the relations between the two 
countries, instead it should serve as a synopsis of Switzerland's official and non-
official efforts to reinforce and broaden its relations with South Africa. 
4.2 OFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SWITZERLAND AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 
4.2.1 The Diplomatic Domain 
Swiss representation in South Africa includes the Embassy in Pretoria (with an office 
in Cape Town open during the parliamentary sessions), a Consulate General in 
Johannesburg and a Consulat '.." in Cape Town responsible for trade relations. Although 
South Africa does not qualify for development assistance as it is regarded as a middle 
income country, the Swiss government decided to initiate a special programme to 
support the country in its democratisation process. Given South Africa's hegemonic 
position in the region, it is believed that the success of South Africa could have far-
reaching benefits not only for the Southern African region, but also for the whole 
African continent. Thus the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
established an office in Johannesburg (now located in Pretoria) in 1995. Cultural 
relations were also boosted with the opening of an antenna office of Pro Helvetia, the 
Swiss Arts Council in November 1998. The antenna office became the second such 
office on the African continent. As Ambassador Schaller mentioned, he is one of few 
Swiss Ambassadors to have so many activities converging in one country. This is a 
further sign that South Africa is regarded as significant within the scope of Swiss 
foreign policy. 
A series of high-level official (government-to-government) meetings (see Table 4.1) 
have also strengthened the contacts between Switzerland and South Africa. Since 
1994, regular official visits by Swiss and South African dignitaries have been taking 
place34). It is significant to note that official communiques and comments by Swiss 
34l As noted in Chapter Three, Sw · ,z:erland received South African dignitaries during the apartheid era, 
but visits were very low profile and often not regarded as official. Swiss officials visiting South 
Africa n01mally conducted these visits in their private capacity. 
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and South African diplomats after such official visits emphasise the cordial 
atmosphere in which meetings were conducted. 
Table 4.1 
High-ranking bilateral visits between Switzerland and South Africa 
Swiss Federal Councillors' visits to South Africa 
1994 - Federal Councillor Cotti (Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
1996 - Federal President Delamuraz (meeting held in the framework of UNCT AD 
IX) 
1998 - Federal President Cotti 
1999 - Federal Councillor Deiss (Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
South African government visits to Switzerland 
1995 - President Mandela and Vice-President Mbeki 
1996 - Vice-President Mbeki (meeting held in the framework of the World 
Economic Forum) 
1997 - President Mandela (meeting held in the framework of the 50th Jubilee of 
GATT) 
1998 - Vice-President Mbeki (meeting held m the framework of the World 
Economic Forum) 
1998 - President Mandela 
1999 - President Mandela (meeting held in the framework of the World Economic 
Forum) 
2000 - President Mbeki (meeting held in the framework of the World Economic 
Forum) 
2001 - President Mbeki (meeting held in the framework of the World Economic 
Forum) 
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The presence of important South African delegations at the World Economic Forum 
in Davos and the Forum of Crans-Montana35) also provided the opportunity for 
bilateral contacts to be deepened. In addition, the visits of a delegation of Swiss 
parliamentarians (July 1998) and two economic delegations (March 1995 and August 
1998) to assess the political and economic developments in South Africa and to 
establish local contacts, further promoted bilateral relations. The importance of these 
regular high-level meetings lies firstly, in the fact that the leaders of the two countries 
have the opportunity to bring salient issues to the attention of their counterpart. For 
instance, during the visit of President Mbeki in 2001, he used the meeting to inform 
the Swiss government of the progress of the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEP AD). Secondly, the Memorandum of Understanding of 1994 and 
the Declaration of Intent on .:-oint Activities of 1998 were signed during the visits of 
Federal President Cotti. During the visit of Federal Councillor Deiss in 1999, an 
agreement was signed to extend the period for development aid until 2004. Thirdly, 
the high-level visits also assist in keeping the attention of the Swiss media and public 
focused on Switzerland's relations with South Africa36>. 
4.2.2 The Economic Domain 
4.2.2 .1 Bilateral trade (1994-2001) 
In Chapter Three it was noted that economic relations continued throughout the 
apartheid era and remained intact during the transition years of the democratically 
elected government. Entering the 1990s, South Africa remained by far Switzerland' s 
most important trading partner on the African continent. South Africa belongs to 
Switzerland's medium size trading partners world-wide. Likewise, Switzerland has 
ranked as one of the top ten South African trading partners for decades. The Swiss 
business community also saw the potential of maintaining commercial links with 
35l In 1997 South Africa was invited as a guest country to the Forum of Crans Montana. The aim of the 
forum is to introduce new and emerging market countries to Western Europe. With delegates 
representing some of the most powerful economic nations, the greatest benefit for South Africa 
would be the opening of new investment possibilities. The 35 person delegation was led by Minister 
Pallo Jordan (Beeld, 11 June l 9':17). 
36) Swiss Embassy, October 2000, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 3 August 1998; The Sunday Independent, 
12 July 1998. 
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South Africa. Today, most o Switzerland's major corporations have well established 
business relations with the country. 
Agreements such as the double taxation agreement (1968), the bilateral investment 
protection agreement (1995), as well as the inclusion of South Africa on the list of the 
beneficiary countries of the Swiss preference scheme (1997) have further 
strengthened bilateral trade relations. South Africa was also targeted as a priority 
country by the Swiss Organisation for Facilitating Investment (SOFI). Having this 
status, South Africa can benefit from investment projects between Swiss companies 
and local partners and the positive spin-offs such as the transfer of capital, technology 
and managerial know-how37). In 1998, an agreement was also signed concerning the 
exchange of trainees (Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland-South Africa: 
1999). 
Figure 4.1 
Trade relations between CH and RSA 
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37l A pilot project of SOFI is the Inqaba Biotechnical Industries based in Pretoria. See . www.sofi.ch 
and www.ingaba.com. 
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Table 4.2 
Trade relations between Switzerland and South Africa 
1994 > 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CH-Imports 207 284 360 395 495 418 504 
CH-Exports 677 700 695 558 567 489 604 
The trade figures are given in current Swiss Francs and are not corrected for the rate of inflation. 
[Source: Swiss Customs Service] 
636 
511 
According to Swiss statistics (excluding gold, as it is not included in Switzerland's 
foreign trade statistics)38l, the overall trade volume between Switzerland and South 
Africa rose from CHF 884 million in 1994 to CHF 1.147 billion in 2001 (See Table 
4.2). In terms of the percentage of Switzerland's overall foreign trade volume, South 
Africa occupies a fairly modest position. In 2000 South Africa ranked 22nd in 
Switzerland's export of goods and 27th in Switzerland's import of goods. However, 
bilateral trade volume is equivalent to the cumulative trade-exchanges of Switzerland 
with the rest of Africa. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, with the exception of 1994, the 
trade volume has exceeded CHF 900 million. The overall trade volume between 
Switzerland and South Africa was at its lowest between 1998 and 1999, but still 
exceeded CHF 900 million. The year 2000, once again saw a sharp rise in bilateral 
trade with the overall trade volume increasing to more than CHF 1 billion. From 1994 
the trade surplus favoured S'vitzerland. However, after reaching a level of CHF 700 
million between 1995 and 1996, Swiss exports fell steadily while Swiss imports 
increased. Significantly, Swiss imports exceeded Swiss exports in 2001. The high 
world price offered for platinum, partly accounts for the increase of imports from 
South Africa39). The weakening of the South African economy (including the constant 
devaluation of the South African rand, see Table 4.3) has also had a negative 
influence on Swiss exports. Switzerland's traditional export commodities to South 
Africa are primarily machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and instruments. Swiss 
38) The South African statistics on foreign trade with Switzerland will give a different picture, as gold 
ingots are included. 
39l Platinum constitutes 75% of total imports by Switzerland from South Africa. 
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imports consist largely of precious metals, followed by raw materials and agricultural 
products.40 l 
Table 4.3 
Exchange rate between the SA rand and Swiss franc 
Year SA rand per Swiss franc Year Swiss franc per SA rand 
1994 2.60 1994 0.39 
1995 3.07 1995 0.33 
1996 3.47 1996 0.29 
1997 3.18 1997 0.31 
1998 3.83 1998 0.26 
1999 4.07 1999 0.25 
2000 4.10 2000 0.24 
2001 5.10 2001 0.20 
[Source: http://www.oanda.com/convert/fXaverage] 
4.2.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment since 1994 
Switzerland is also an important foreign investor. Since the change to a democratic 
dispensation in South Africa in 1994, new Swiss foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
estimated at approximately five billion Rand (see Table 4.4). According to the 
statistics of the South Africau Reserve Bank (see Table 4.5), Switzerland is the fifth 
largest investor after the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
40J See: Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland-South Africa: 1999 for the complete overview 
of bilateral h·ade between South Africa and Switzerland, as well as Swiss Customs Service at 
www.zoll.admin.ch. 
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Table 4.4 
Swiss Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - 1994 to 2000 
Swiss FDI into SA % of Total FDI into SA if - ~ -
Year Totals in R millions 
.................. 
1994 180 2.87% 
1995 677 11.85% 
1996 409 4.49% 
1997 345 2.18% 
1998 1,750 9.47% 
1999 1,400 5.52% 
2000 708 5.20% 
[Source: BusinessMap Foundation Foreign Direct Investment Database.] 
Table 4.5 
Foreign liabilities of SA 
Ranking Foreign Investor *(R millions) 
1 UK 242,926 
2 USA 19,625 
3 GERMANY 19,090 
4 NETHERLANDS 11 ,006 
5 SWITZERLAND 10,263 
* Figures represent stock, i.e. accumulated book value of foreign-owned assets in South Africa as on 31 
December 2000. 
[Source: SA Reserve Bank] 
More than 250 Swiss companies, including most of Switzerland's multinationals, are 
represented in South Africa. Companies are concentrated mainly in the machinery, 
chemical, pharmaceutical and food industries, as well as the service sector. More than 
21 000 people are employed by Swiss owned companies. With links dating back to 
the tum of the 20th century, many of these companies have become household names 
in South Africa. Some of the "big names" represented in South Africa include: 
• Food industry 
Nestle South Africa ("ee Box 4.1) 
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• Pharmaceutical and Cnemicals sector 
Novartis South Africa, Roche Products, Ciba Speciality Chemicals 
• Engineering and Machinery sector 
ABB Holding, Holderbank, Buhler, Schindler, Sulzer 
• Service sector 
UBS AG, Credit Suisse South Africa and Credit Suisse First Boston (Banks) 
Swiss Re Southern Africa (Insurance) 
Box 4.1 
Nestle - South Africa's fourth biggest foreign employer 
Nescafe, Smarties, Maggi, Cremora and Huskies are all well-known brand names in 
South Africa and all products of Nestle. With 14 manufacturing sites and providing 
employment for almost 5 000 people, Nestle South Africa is the most important Swiss 
investor in South Africa and the African continent. The history of the corporation in 
South Africa spans several decades with Nestle products first being imported and 
offered for sale by agents in 1870. Nestle was registered as a local company in 1916. 
Through a development strategy of new product development and acquisition, Nestle 
merged with Alimentana S.A. (1947), acquired Crosse & Blackwell (1960), acquired 
the Carnation Company and Lopis Pet Care Company (1985), acquired Buitoni-
Perugina and Rowntree (1988), purchased Tm-Can (Pty) Ltd (1992), acquired Valvita 
and Schoonspruit (2000) and acquired a 100% stake in Dairymaid-Nestle (2002). 
Today, Nestle manufactures a wide range of products in the areas of confectionary, 
groceries, ice cream, water products, milk, nutritional products and pet food41 ). 
Nestle South Africa has also committed funds since the 1980s to help address the 
many social challenges facing the country. The focus of the social responsibility 
programme has been to find sustainable solutions to problems in the areas of health, 
food and water security, sanitation, unemployment and the environment. Non-
governmental organisations, particularly community based development 
organisations, have been targeted to implement these programmes, thus creating 
4 1) See www.nestle.co.za. 
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employment opportunities and equipping local communities with much needed skills. 
Projects supported by Nestle SA include: 
Eco/ink 's Earthcare programme and LEAP - water harvesting and food gardening 
projects 
WARMTH programme - community based feeding scheme 
Valley Trust - promotion of health care project 
Project HeadStart - training unskilled caregivers working with pre-school children 
Nestle was, however, also implicated in a report by the Centre Europe - Tiers Monde 
for exploiting its workers nnd paying unequal wages. In 1971, the problem of 
discrimination against black workers regarding wages and retirement funds was raised 
at a general meeting of Nestle in Lausanne. Although the President of the company 
promised to address the issue, the matter was not followed up. Nearly three decades 
later, the involvement of Swiss businesses in apartheid-South Africa is again under 
the spotlight. Nestle, like other Swiss firms, stands accused of supporting the 
apartheid regime, since the corporation adhered to discriminatory practises by not 
treating its workforce equally and by refusing to participate in the disinvestments 
campaign. 
Today, Nestle is committed to Employment Equity in line with the company's Basic 
Management and Leadership Principles. Nestle South Africa has an Advisory Board 
which comprises nine members of whom five are African, three White and one of 
Indian descent. Furthermore, on the Management Board of Nestle, the Human 
Resources Director, as well as the Milk and Nutrition Business Manager are both 
African. The Director of Communication and Public Affairs and the MIS Manager are 
both of Indian descent. Thus a substantial part of the top management is not white, 
and plans to extend this further are already underway42). 
42) Alfred Kaelin, Managing Director of Nestle South Africa. 
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4.2.3 The Development Cooperation Domain 
4.2.3. l Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
Following the South African elections in 1994, the Swiss Government decided to 
expand its development assistance with the aim of supporting the crucial transition 
process towards the formation of a truly democratic society. Under the normal criteria 
of Swiss development policy, South Africa was not eligible for Swiss aid, since 
funding is usually geared towards the poorest countries of the world. However, South 
Africa was viewed as a unique case. Firstly, South Africa is Switzerland's most 
important trade and investrr,~nt partner in Africa and the country is also home to 
approximately 9 000 Swiss nationals . Secondly, South Africa holds a significant 
position on the African continent and is often referred to as a "model" for the rest of 
the region. The relevance of the transition process for South Africa, as well as the 
African continent, therefore justified a special programme. It is also clear that 
Switzerland has many vested interests in South Africa and that assisting the country 
would be mutually beneficial. Furthermore, it shows that the Swiss government has 
confidence in the potential that a transformed and economically prosperous South 
Africa holds. 
In September 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the Swiss 
Government formalising its commitment for development cooperation for a period of 
five years ( 1994-1999). The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC)43l, earmarked CHF 60 million for programmes in the areas of land reform, 
education, democracy and human rights. Since the transformation process in South 
Africa took longer than originally anticipated, a second round of development 
cooperation was approved by the Swiss Government. The SDC mandate was extended 
for an additional four years (2000-2004) with the signing of a second agreement for 
development aid by Federal Councillor Deiss in October 1999. The SDC was 
43) Both the SDC and Political Afr'.lirs Division IV (earlier Political Affairs Division III) form part of 
the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The SDC is the official aid agency of the Swiss 
government, while the PA IV is responsible for peace policy and human security and peace 
promotion. 
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allocated an annual budget of CHF 7 million until the termination of its mandate at 
the end of 2004. 
As stated in the SDC Strategy 2000-2004 document, the overall goal of the SDC 
Programme in South Africa is "[to] contribute to a reduced potential for internal 
conflicts and greater development prospects, through reduction of inequality, the 
integration of social groups, better governance, and more deeply rooted democratic 
institutions." Regarding the region the overall goal is "[to] contribute to an increased 
interaction of SADC countries with each other, through regional projects, as well as 
through political dialogue and donor dialogue." 
Unlike the pre-1994 period, the South African government now became a partner 
together with the NGOs. According to Remy Duiven, Project Manager of the SDC in 
Pretoria, projects were aimed at improving the quality of life of ordinary South 
Africans. In selecting a target region, the SDC decided on the Eastern Cape Province 
as it was one of the poorest regions of South Africa. In addition, most of the SDC 
partners were already located in this province. He states that certain projects have 
been very successful in developing mechanisms that could be replicated. In other 
instances, projects faced difficulties, primarily due to the lack of implementation 
capacities of the SDC partners, be it NGOs or the South African government. 
Bilateral cooperation44) included a wide variety of projects in the key sectors that were 
identified45 ) (see Box 4.2 for a description of the Swiss-South African Cooperation 
Initiative, a joint effort between the SDC and the Swiss business community). 
• Education 
Funding amounting to CHF 6 million was given for bursaries to students from 
disadvantaged groups during the first round of SDC funding. The funding was 
channelled through the Tertiary Fund of South Africa (TEFSA). 
44
> Die Burger, 29 July 1998, 4 Augustus 1998; The Star, 30 July 1998, 30 July 1999; Eastern 
Province Herald, 17 June 2000. 
45
> See appendix 1 for a complete list of SDC partners. 
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• Land reform 
Support was given for tenure reform and decentralisation programmes of the 
Department of Agriculture. Land reform is a priority area of the SDC's 
involvement in South Africa and funding will be provided until 2004. 
• Supporting development in the Eastern Cape Province 
The most comprehensive development aid went to the improvement of life in 
the townships, especially in Port Elizabeth. It is estimated that up to 2 800 
families will have benefited from the upgrading of townships. Support for this 
province will continue until 2004. 
• South African Constitution 
The writing of the new South African Constitution was supported with CHF 1 
million during the first round of SDC funding . 
• Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
CHF 1 Million was also contributed in support of the work of the TRC during 
the first round of SDC funding. 
For the second period of development aid, the focus of the SDC programmes 
remained the South African transitional process, but the scope was widened to include 
the whole region (namely members of the Southern African Development 
Community). Four changes were also introduced in the second programme. Firstly, 
greater focus was placed on the Eastern Cape Province. Secondly, there was a shift 
from NGO implementation to more state implementation. Thirdly, taking into account 
the phasing out of SDC activities in South Africa, NGOs were encouraged to enlarge 
their domestic funding base. Fourthly, initiatives were taken to move towards a more 
regional approach, by launching pilot projects in other countries of the region. 
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Box 4.2 
Swiss-South African Cooperation Initiative (SSACI) 
The Swiss-South African Cooperation Initiative is a joint initiative between the SDC 
and Swiss private companies operating in South Africa. What makes SSACI unique is 
that it has brought together an international donor agency (the SDC) and the private 
sector of a recipient country (South Africa). This is a new approach for the Swiss, 
since there is normally a strict separation between the private and public sectors. The 
reasons for this initiative were twofold: firstly, the SDC saw the need to encourage 
long-term local participation in its development programme in South Africa and 
secondly, several private companies already funding local community projects 
decided to pool their corporate social investment budgets in order to increase their 
impact. 
SSACI is registered as a public-benefit trust m South Africa, with trustees 
representing the Swiss government, sponsors and the wider South African 
community. The founding corporate sponsors include Alpha Cement, Ciba Speciality 
Chemicals, Credit Suisse, Givaudan-Roure, Novartis Pharmaceuticals, Schindler 
Lifts, Sika Finanz, Swiss Re, UBS and Xstrata. The corporate sponsors collectively 
agreed to contribute CHF 1 million annually for a period of five years. The SDC 
undertook to match the total corporate donation. According to Duiven, the fom1al 
commitment for SDC funding is until the end of 2004. A decision on further funding 
will be taken at a later stage, taking into account the responses from the business 
community. The Trust is intended to be a permanent entity and to continue in 
perpetuity. 
SSACI's principal objective is to reduce poverty and promote social and economic 
development in South Africa by funding projects and programmes that focus on 
educational and vocational opportunities, as well as job creation for unemployed, out-
of-school youths (target group aged 16-26 years) from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
The ultimate aim is to improve the employment prospects of young South Africans. A 
secondary objective is to foster a culture of corporate sponsorship among Swiss and 
South African private companies and to encourage dialogue amongst companies on 
subjects relating to corporate responsibility, community development and poverty 
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alleviation. The SSAGI has forged partnerships with non-governmental and 
community based organisations for the implementation of projects. By June 2001, 
SSACI had committed funds to seven projects in its effort to improve the lot of 
marginalized youths (Ken Duncan - Fax communique). 
4.2.3.2 Political Affairs Division IV - Peace-building46) 
Under the Memorandum of Understanding, the Political Affairs Division III 
contributed CHF 20 million for the period 1994 to 1999 aimed at promoting and 
maintaining peace with collciboration focused specifically on South Africa. With the 
signing of the Declaration of Intent on Joint Activities in August 1998 (during the 
visit of Federal President Cotti), the cooperation between the two countries gained a 
greater regional scope with Political Affairs Division III forging and reinforcing 
partnerships with various South African organisations in the fields of conflict 
resolution and conflict prevention inside South Africa, the SADC region and other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The declaration is in line with Swiss Peace Policy 
which intends to contribute to the strengthening of African capacity to assume the 
responsibility and the development of African-specific solutions to crises and violent 
conflicts on the continent. With an annual budget of between CHF 2,5 million for the 
period 2000 to 2004 (and beyond), the Political Affairs Division IV will continue 
supporting projects and programmes in the Southern African region. 
Partnerships (and programmes) have been maintained with the following 
organisations: 
• The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
Containment of the proliferation of small arms 
Early warning programme 
• The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) 
Constitutional questions 
46) Political Affairs Division III was initially responsible for the cooperation with South Africa in 
programmes relating to peace building and human rights. In 2001, the responsibility for cooperation 
with South Africa was shifted to the Political Affairs Division IV. Both Divisions form part of the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. 
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• The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAHA) 
The peace process in Angola 
• The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
The resolution of labour conflict 
• The Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Africa (A WEPA) 
The reinforcement of parliaments in Southern Africa 
In particular, the Institute for Security Studies (see Box 4.3) based in Pretoria, has 
benefited greatly from Swiss cooperation and has received substantial funding for its 
projects47l. 
Box 4.3 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)48 l 
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), formerly known as the Institute for Defence 
Policy has been a recipient of Swiss funding since 1995. The PA IV provided 1,2 
million USD to support the ISS programme to combat the uncontrolled spread of 
small arms in Africa. Central to the research undertaken at the Institute is its early 
warning programme, the African Security Analysis Programme (ASAP) which has 
received funding amounting to 910 000 USD since 1998. This programme monitors 
African events, identifies threats to human security on the continent and provides 
analyses for governments and international organisations which can be used towards 
the development of policy options for conflict prevention, conflict management and 
conflict resolution. In 2002, the ISS received a positive evaluation mandated by the 
Swiss government and received the recommendation that the programme be 
continued. The ASAP has gained the recognition of being a reference point for 
consultation on future development in the region (Center for Peacebuilding-KOFF 
Newsletter, March 2002). 
47) Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 13 October 1999; Tages-Anzeiger, 13 October 1999; SDC Strategy 2000-
2004 document. 
48
> See www. iss .co.za. 
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4.2.3.3 State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (seco) 
The private sector in South Africa has also benefited from financial support of the 
Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs. The State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (seco) provided CHF 10 million for the period 1994 to 1999 for the 
development of small and medium sized enterprises targeting entrepreneurs from the 
historically disadvantaged groups. Seco forged partnerships with local financial 
institutions, particularly Venture Capital Fund of Msele Nedeventure Ltd, for the 
implementation of its programme. Box 4.4 describes the support seco provided to 
launch the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa. 
Box 4.4 
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC)49) 
Based at the University of Stellenbosch since 2002, TRALAC is one of the most 
important recipients of Swiss government funding. It is an autonomous regional 
organisation, founded and supported by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(seco ), the University of Stellenbosch Faculty of Law and the University of Namibia 
Faculty of Law. With an estimated annual budget of 800 000 USD, seco has 
contributed approximately 3n million rand towards the establishment of the centre. 
Seco decided to support the initiative, as it wanted to assist in tackling the problem of 
the lack of knowledge concerning the legal aspects of international trade. By 
providing funding to the centre, it aims to give beneficiary countries a means to build 
and improve their own capacities so that they can be better prepared for future trade 
negotiations. By supporting TRALAC, seco has also furthered the Swiss desire of 
creating a healthy world economy (including the economic development of 
underdeveloped and developing countries) as alluded to in Chapter One. Financial 
support by seco has been approved for a period of three years. After the completion of 
this initial stage, an external evaluation will determine a two-year phasing out 
strategy. 
49l See: www.tralac.org. 
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The aims of seco are reflected in the needs identified by TRALAC. In order for the 
Southern African region to participate effectively in both regional as well as global 
trade, capacity and competence in the legal aspects of trade need to be developed and 
strengthened. TRALAC's mission is "to build trade law intellectual capital to 
facilitate the integration of the [Southern African] region into the global trade 
system". In reaching its aims, the centre intends to create, accumulate and disseminate 
relevant knowledge and information concerning general trade law. The governments, 
universities as well as the private sector of the Southern African region, stand to 
benefit from the research undertaken by TRALAC. 
4.2.4 The Cultural Domain 
4.2.4.1 Pro Helvetia50) 
Although cultural links existed during the apartheid era51 l, the Swiss had no formal 
cultural representation in South Africa. In recent years, an impetus for cultural 
exchange between Switzerland and South Africa was given by the Arts Council of 
Switzerland, known as Pro Helvetia. Although the advancement of arts is a cantonal 
responsibility, Pro Helvetia, a non-aligned cultural foundation funded by the Swiss 
government, was created in 1939 to emphasise the value and significance of Swiss 
culture. Today, however, Pro Helvetia's work at home and abroad is defined by other 
priorities focusing attention on promoting the arts and furthering cultural dialogue and 
exchange. In fostering cultural foreign relations, Pro Helvetia's head office based in 
Zurich, together with the liaison offices and cultural centres abroad, the Swiss 
diplomatic service as well as domestic and foreign institutions showcase Swiss art in 
foreign countries, while simultaneously promoting reciprocal cultural exchanges and 
the building up of a network of international partnerships. 
50l See www.prohelvetia.ch. 
51) A Council responsible for the cultural affairs was accredited in 1982 (SA Embassy, Annual Report 
1982). Various opera and musical groups, including the Lucerne Festival Strings, also visited South 
Africa (SA Embassy 1965). 
67 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
The establishment of Pro Helvetia's Liaison Office South Africa (PHLOSA) based in 
Cape Town brought a significant growth in cultural exchange between Switzerland 
and South Africa. This office, the second satellite office of the Arts Council of 
Switzerland on African soil, opened officially in 1998. According to Laely, the Head 
of the International Cultural Exchange Unit at Pro Helvetia, the closing of an antenna 
office in Berlin in 1996 and the subsequent availability of funding motivated the 
grounding of a new office abroad. Research studies were also undertaken in India and 
South America, but South Africa was selected as it provided a dynamic backdrop for 
the building of cultural relations. Since cultural links already existed between India 
and South America, South Africa's position was further strengthened as the country 
had been isolated culturally during the apartheid era. Whereas relations with the other 
two regions could have been maintained by the Pro Helvetia head office, it was 
deemed too difficult to initiate cultural relations without a satellite office in place. 
South Africa appealed to Pro Helvetia and Swiss artists for several reasons . Firstly, 
similar to Switzerland, South Africa is a multi-faceted society in a continuing process 
to find a shared identity. Secondly, the discussions between "white-centred art" and 
"black-centred art" and the fact that the South African arts community was already 
accustomed to moving between different worlds, heightened interest. Thirdly, the 
infrastructure available to tl:c arts is better developed in South Africa than in other 
developing countries. Laely denies that the decision to establish an office in South 
Africa had an underlying political motive - it was not an act of reconciliation on the 
part of Switzerland after its involvement with the apartheid government (Afrika 
Bulletin; November/December 1997). 
PHLOSA works within all the arts disciplines and the focus is on three mam 
activities; namely: the showcasing of Swiss events in South Africa, as well as 
Southern Africa; the participation of Swiss and South African artists in the cultural 
exchange programme; and the funding of local cultural events, infrastructure support 
and educational workshops. The latter activity did not initially form part of Pro 
Helvetia's mandate, as activities always had to be linked to the Swiss arts . However, 
it was soon realised that there were many projects that did not necessarily have an 
artistic link to Switzerland, but were worthy of fostering. Thus, the contract signed 
with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in May 1999 
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enabling the funding of capacity building, knowledge transfer and infrastructure 
projects, filled an urgent need. As stated by Mirjam Asmal, Office Manager of 
PHLOSA, the development and education approach of the SDC complements the 
"high arts" approach of Pro Helvetia. The diversity is evident in the projects that Pro 
Helvetia has supported. These range from the Ballet du Grand de Geneve (co-funded 
by the French Institute) and artist- in-residence programmes in various Swiss cities to 
the supporting of local events such as the One City Festival in Cape Town (mandate 
funds of SDC) and the joint South African tour of the Company Nomades le Loft from 
Switzerland and the Jazzart Dance Theatre from South Africa. 
For the period 1998 to 2000, Pro Helvetia administered a budget of CHF 1 169 532 
(roughly 5 million Rand) for the Southern African region. The contribution of the 
SDC to this budget amounted to 24%. Over the three years, the distribution of the 
budget was 21 % for 1998, 34% in 1999 and 45% in 2000. Projects supported by 
PHLOSA increased from 15 in 1998 to 41 in 2000. In a general evaluation52) of the 
initial period 1998 to 2000, an external audit stated that Pro Helvetia had made a 
significant impact on the arts and cultural life in South Africa, given the adverse 
developments in this domain over the past years. In a questionnaire to a selection of 
partners, all agreed that the importance of international agencies in assisting the arts 
could not be overemphasised as the arts sector was in dire need of additional funding. 
Table 4.6 shows the total distribution of projects during the first three years. It can be 
concluded that a mutually beneficial cultural exchange programme is in place with a 
similar number of visits between Switzerland and South Africa (except that South 
African artists travelling to Switzerland often go as individuals or in pairs, while 
several Swiss groups have travelled to South Africa). 
52J The external audit/evaluation was done by Article 27, Mike van Graan, in Cape Town. 
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Table 4.6 
Total distribution of PHLOSA projects for 1998 to 2000 
National i.e. taking place in more than one city 10 
Cape Town i.e. taking place only in Cape Town 12 
Durban i.e. taking place only in Durban 2 
Johannesburg i.e. taking place only in Johannesburg/Pretoria 7 
Eastern Cape 
Southern Africa 1 
Switzerland to South Africa 18 
South Africa to Switzerland 21 
Southern Africa to South Africa 0 
South Africa to Southern Africa 2 
Southern Africa to Switzerland 1 
Total 75 
Finally, after the external audit was undertaken in 2001, it was decided to continue the 
office for a further period of four years. The SDC has allocated CHF 200 000 per year 
for this period53l, while PHLOSA has a project budget of CHF 246 000 for 2002. 
Thus, South African artists and local arts and cultural projects will continue to receive 
much needed funding, be exposed to excellent examples of Swiss art, benefit from 
projects aiding in the building of local capacity and be given the opportunity to do in-
residency programmes and research tours in Switzerland. 
4.3 UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SWITZERLAND AND 
SOUTH AFRICA 
4.3.1 The Economic Domain 
Within the business sector, there are four private and independent bodies promoting 
bilateral economic relations between Switzerland and South Africa. 
53
> The SDC will be phasing out its activities at the end of 2004, meaning that PHLOSA will be losing 
a valuable partner and source of funding . 
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4.3 .1.1 Swiss-South African Association (SSAA) 
The Swiss-South African Association (SSAA) is the oldest of the three organisations 
that have promoted relations with South Africa since 1956. The organisation has been 
heavily criticised by the former anti-apartheid organisations in Switzerland for its 
close links to the apartheid government. As was noted in Chapter Three, it is clear that 
the SSAA played a pivotal role in keeping both economic and political relations 
between the two countries on a sound footing during the apartheid era. Gauged 
against world and domestic 0pinion towards the policy of apartheid, criticism that the 
SSAA supported the apartheid regime can be justified. The SSAA has continued its 
activities and has reformulated its purpose within the context of the new South Africa. 
The purpose of the Swiss-South African Association is to foster the relationship 
between Switzerland and modem South Africa and to enhance the 
understanding of the Swiss for the various challenges of South Africa. This is 
not only the case for economic issues, but also for political and social questions. 
The Swiss-South African Association is aware of the key role South Africa 
plays in the development of the whole continent54). 
According to Dr Anton Schrafl, President of the SSAA since 1983, the Association 
wants to make a positive contribution to the South African economy. With the change 
of government, good relations have been fostered between the SSAA and the ANC-
led government. The SSAA hosted Nelson Mandela for one day during his visit to 
Switzerland in 1997 and President Mandela also addressed a meeting of the SSAA 
members. Furthermore, Dr Schrafl became South Africa's Honorary Consul in 2000, 
the second member of the SSAA to fulfil this role (Willy Staehelin being the first). 
This appointment was not welcomed by the former anti-apartheid organisations, 
because Dr Schrafl is seen as a supporter of the former apartheid government. The 
South Africa Bulletin (July 2000), however, noted that their President ' s appointment 
as proof that the South Afri ..:;an government was forward-looking. It recognised the 
value of bringing someone on board with such vast experience in the business sector 
and Swiss-South African relations in general. 
54l Schweizer Monatshefte - Vol 2, February 2000, 31-33. 
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Working towards this goal, the Association continues to organise regular meetings 
and invites key persons in the political, economic and social sphere to inform its 
members of the challenges facing South Africa55). The Association also facilitates 
contacts between government departments, economic and development organisations 
and universities in both Switzerland and South Africa. In this context the Association 
supports the initiatives of the respective governments and organisations m 
strengthening Swiss-South African relations and coordinates its efforts with them. 
4.3.1.2 Swiss Business Council (SBC) 
A partner to the Swiss-South African Association, the Swiss Business Council (SBC) 
founded in 1996, is a powerful lobby group in South Africa representing the interests 
of 40 mainly Swiss multinational corporations. The SBC is the successor organisation 
of the former Swiss Committee which formed part of the South Africa Foundation. 
After the re-organisation of the SA Foundation in the early 1990s and the subsequent 
disbanding of the Swiss Committee, the SBC was established. The SBC was founded 
to provide members with a forum to promote their common interests and to represent 
the Swiss business community with the relevant authorities in South Africa and 
Switzerland. Furthermore, the SBC undertakes to promote and develop trade, 
commercial and financial li~1<s between the two countries and to contribute to the 
enhancement of their respective images (Constitution of the Swiss Business Council, 
1996). 
4.3.1.3 Swiss-South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCISSA) 
The Swiss-South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCISSA) and its 
sister chamber in South Africa, the Chamber of Commerce and Industries Southern 
Africa-Switzerland, was initiated in 1996 by the South African, Albie Geldenhuys56) 
as neither the SSAA or the SBC fulfilled the role of a chamber of commerce. The 
Chamber's main objective is to provide small, medium and micro sized enterprises 
55l Since 1994 speakers have included Alec Erwin (1995) , Cyril Ramaphosa (1997), Johann Rupert 
(1999) and Tito Mboweni (2001). 
56) Albie Geldenhuys is a former South African diplomat and also represented the Department of 
Manpower at the International Labour Organisation in Geneva. He held managerial positions with 
the fertilizer company Triomfand the parastatal Phoskor. Since 1986, he is self-employed. 
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(SMEs and SMMEs) in Switzerland with the opportunity to enter the South African 
and Southern African economy. Similarly, the sister chamber in South Africa assists 
interested businesses to gain access to a Swiss business network. The CCISSA also 
invites prominent South Africans to address its members on the South African 
economy and investment possibilities57 l. 
Although similarities exist m the objectives of the three organisations and 
membership often overlapping, the organisations function independently. The main 
differences between the three organisations are that the SSAA and SBC focus mainly 
on big Swiss corporations, while the CCISSA targets SMEs and SMMEs in both 
Switzerland and South Africa. Secondly, the SSAA and SBC do not disseminate 
business information, hold regular seminars or maintain an up-to-date website to 
inform businesses in the respective countries about business opportunities (i.e. they 
are not engaged in the activities of a chamber of commerce). Thirdly, the SSAA and 
SBC have as their main emphasis the representation of Swiss companies and Swiss 
interest, while the CCISSA aims to foster bilateral relations between the two 
countries58l. 
Some joint efforts have been undertaken. Since July 1999, the publication "South 
Africa - Bulletin fur Informationen, zu Wirtschaft, Politik, Bi/dung and Kultur" is 
published jointly by the SSAA and CCISSA and members are informed and invited to 
the events of both organisations. Despite cooperation between the CCISSA and the 
SSAA and SBC, relations between the organisations (the Chamber on the one hand 
and the SSAA and SBC on the other) have not been without tension. Talks of a 
possible merger between the Chamber and the SBC ended in a deadlock. The 
Chamber and its activities have also been regarded with a certain aloofness from the 
side of the South African Embassy in Berne. It is difficult to determine the root cause 
of the animosity, as the different protagonists are very vague in their assessment of 
the matter. It would appear that it could be a combination of personalities clashing, 
some "business jealously" at the surprising success of a group of "outsiders" or 
"upstarts" in initiating a chamber of commerce without the participation of the 
"established" organisations and the differences in foci, especially concerning 
57
> Past speakers include Neil van Heerden (1999), Johann Rupert (1999) and Kevin Wakeford (2000). 
58) See www.chsa.ch and www.saswiss.co.za. 
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membership. However, in viewing the aims and objectives, as well as the activities of 
the three organisations, it seems unnecessary that tension should exist, since there is 
no apparent encroachment on the interests of the other. In the writer's opinion, it 
would be far more beneficial to all the organisations if they support one another and 
view each other as complementary rather than standing in opposition. 
4.3 .1.4 Stidafrikamesse.ch 
The Stidafrikamesse.ch (South African Fair in Switzerland) was the brain-child of a 
handful of self confessed "Siidafrikabegeisterten" who wanted to rectify the 
misconceptions that were so often portrayed of South Africa in Switzerland (the Swiss 
media regularly focus on South Africa as a crime-ridden, violent and dangerous 
country that cannot come to grips with its social problems, especially HIV I AIDS) and 
to broaden the understanding of South Africa and the challenges facing the country. 
The organisational team embarked on the initiative to hold a South African Fair, in 
order to move the image of South Africa beyond that displayed on billboards and in 
advertisements, and to provide a visible platform for displaying the country's 
diversity, vibrancy and potential business opportunities. Through the enthusiasm of 
the organisational team, the first South African Fair was launched in Zurich in 2001. 
After the success of the fir:~ fair (close to 3000 people visited the fair during the 
course of one day), the second fair was held in Zurich in May 2002. The second fair 
focused on five themes including tourism, trade and commerce, food and wine, 
charity and entertainment, culture and lifestyle. It is estimated that 5000 people visited 
the fair over two days. Despite its initial success, the organising team is yet to 
convince major Swiss and South African companies to become involved, especially 
through sponsorships. The fair remains unique as it focuses on one country only and it 
has been excellent in showcasing South Africa, its people and its products. However, 
its continued success will only be secured once it moves beyond a few key 
personalities and gains broader-based support59). 
59l See www.suedafrikamesse.ch. 
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4.3.2 The Cultural Domain 
4.3 .2.1 Club of Friends of South Africa 
The Club of Friends of South Africa and the South African Club in Switzerland, are 
two clubs of a more social nature. 
The Club of Friends of South Africa (CFS) like the SSAA had to re-orientate its 
objectives after the new democratic government was instated in South Africa. In 
Chapter Three it was already stated that the Club played an important role to bring 
about greater understanding of the political situation during the apartheid era. After 
experiencing internal problems, the Club is being revamped under a new committee. 
The main goal of the Club is to contribute to a better understanding in Switzerland of 
the multi-cultural South African society, through arranging contacts in the areas of 
politics, economics and culture, organising lectures, participating in events related to 
South Africa and by publishing a newsletter. The CFS also supports social 
programmes in South Africa and has contributed to sponsoring South African 
organisations on their visits to Switzerland. Although the Club's membership is 
considerably smaller than in its hey-day (497 in 2001, down from 1341 in 1991), 
members continue to meet r n a regular basis not only for social events, but also to 
exchange views on political , economic and social issues60 l. 
4.3.2.2 South African Club of Switzerland 
The South African Club of Switzerland61 > was formed during 1993 to create a social 
outlet for South Africans living in Switzerland. The emphasis in this club is to assist 
new arrivals in settling down and to give people the opportunity of meeting fellow 
South Africans, people from Southern Africa and the Swiss. Unlike CF A, SACS is 
run on a very informal basis. There is no active membership and their website is the 
main means to inform interested persons of upcoming events. During the second half 
of 2001, a possible merging of the two clubs was discussed, but subsequently voted 
60
> See www.suedafrika.ch. 
6 1) See www.southemafrica.ch. 
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against. Although a merger is not on the agenda, it remains a point of consideration 
for the future . 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on Switzerland's relations with South Africa for the period 1994 
to 2001. Despite its links with the apartheid regime, Switzerland has continued its 
pragmatic approach towards South Africa and the authorities have been able to forge 
cordial links with the new incumbents. As former President Mandela said during the 
state visit of Federal President Cotti in 1998, " ... schliesslich seien [wir] Freunde, die 
sich eine ganze Zeit nicht gesehen haben" [" ... after all we are friends that have not 
seen each other for a long time] (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 4 August 1998). 
When viewing official relations between the two countries within the domains of 
diplomacy, economy, development cooperation and culture, it is clear that the Swiss 
government has made a concerted effort to strengthen bilateral links. In the diplomatic 
domain, the increasing number of contacts between not only the heads of states of 
both countries, but also between various ministers, senior officials and economic and 
parliamentary delegations have reinforced relations. The regular hosting of 
international conferences in witzerland and South Africa, has also opened additional 
opportunities for the nurturing of official links. These high profile bilateral visits has 
laid the foundation for closer cooperation and mutual understanding between the two 
countries. 
In its efforts to support the democratic process in South Africa, Switzerland has 
provided substantial funding for development aid. The special joint programme of the 
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation and the Political Affairs Division IV, has 
been instrumental in addressing the grave social problems and the question of human 
security which pose real threats to the stability of South Africa's fragile democracy. In 
addition, the promotion of economic relations remains a priority. Both Switzerland 
and South Africa view each other as valuable trade partners. In order to enhance 
relations, a number of agreements have been put in place to facilitate free trade to be 
conducted as unhindered as possible. It must, however, be emphasised that the strong 
presence of the Swiss business community in South Africa together with the support 
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of organisations such as the Swiss-South African Association and Swiss Business 
Council should not be underestimated. The livelihoods of thousands of South 
Africans are dependent on the employment provided by Swiss companies. South 
Africa has also received much needed foreign direct investment from Swiss 
compames. 
In the cultural domain, Pro Helvetia has become an important foreign funding agency 
for the South African cultural scene. It is clear that the local arts face an immense 
struggle to secure sufficient funding and in this respect PHLOSA has played a vital 
role in supporting the myriad of financial needs. Finally, goodwill towards South 
Africa has also been shown by individual Swiss people who take a keen interest in the 
country and in their private capacity engage in activities to improve the image of 
South Africa in Switzerland and to encourage a deeper understanding of the 
complexities of the South African society. 
In Chapter Five, the new debate which was initiated by Swiss pressure groups and 
their supporters in the Swiss parliament, will be described. This debate which has 
elicited considerable media coverage, also shows the influence non-state actors can 
exert on local authorities and domestic policies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SWISS-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS DURING THE APARTHEID ERA: 
THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Swiss-South African relations during the apartheid era, an issue that has neither 
featured on the South African government's political agenda nor received extensive 
coverage in the South African media, has been the topic of much controversy and 
debate within the Swiss media, parliament and former anti-apartheid organisations. 
With the ANC taking over political power in 1994, anti-apartheid organisations in 
particular had to re-evaluate their position, since their main raison d'etre, the toppling 
of the apartheid regime, had been achieved. However, towards the end of the 1990s, 
the former anti-apartheid organisations gained new momentum by pledging their 
solidarity with Jubilee South Africa, an organisation with the explicit mandate to 
pursue a campaign whereby creditor nations were called upon to cancel debts arising 
from the apartheid era (odious debts), as well as providing reparation to victims of 
apartheid, who had their suffering prolonged by banks and corporations that had 
propped up the apartheid regime. In this chapter, the different state and non-state 
actors and their actions in thi::. recent debate that has flared up, will be explained. 
5.2 REVISITING SWITZERLAND'S PAST RELATIONS WITH SOUTH 
AFRICA 
In Chapter Three it was noted that South Africa has for decades been a theme in the 
Swiss public and official arena. However, the most recent debate reflects on a wider 
issue which has profoundly affected Swiss society; namely, the role of Switzerland 
during the Second World War. The shadows which findings cast over the integrity 
and honesty of the Swiss government and banks had far-reaching repercussions and 
created a new sensitivity for allegations of unlawful profiteering during times of 
conflict. In South Africa, the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), which included investigations concerning international aspects of the 
apartheid regime, brought Switzerland and the activities of the Swiss business 
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community and intelligence service under the spotlight. In his article "Die Schweiz 
und Siidafrika wahrend der Apartheid: Kontroverse und "Agenda -Setting" nach 
1998 ", Pfister (2000: 1-25) aptly describes the influence of pressure groups on Swiss 
domestic policy and provides greater insight into this new debate. 
In his article, Pfister (2000: 10) refers to National Councillor Pia Hollenstein 
(Member of the Green Party: St Gallen) as a key figure in keeping the debate on 
South Africa alive in the Swiss parliament and Federal Council through her 
parliamentary requests (16 requests between 1997 and 2001)62). An ordinary question, 
"Switzerland should explain its relations with South Africa'', posed by Hollenstein on 
20 March 1997, provided the first impetus for the most recent Swiss-South African 
debate. In its response, the Federal Council viewed its past policy stance towards 
South Africa in a critical light for the first time and declared that in hindsight, its 
neutral political decisions concerning non-participation in economic sanctions were 
understandable in the Cold War context, but could not be perceived as politically far-
sighted63). 
One year later, on 20 March 1998, the second parliamentary demand came as a 
parliamentary initiative requesting "Re-examining of Switzerland's relations with 
South Africa during the year~ 1948-1994". The parliamentary initiative was supported 
by 28 parliamentarians (Social Democratic Party-SPS 18, Green Party 5, Christian 
Democratic People's Party-CVP 3, Radical Free Democratic Party-FDP 2). The 
demand for a simple Federal decision (einfacher Bundesbeschluss) meant that the 
initiative was first channelled to the Legal Commission of the National Council. The 
Initiative was only to be dealt with in January 1999 by the Legal Commission and in 
March 1999 by the National Council, indicating that the subject of Swiss-South 
African relations during the apartheid era was not regarded as a matter of urgency. In 
the meantime, the Green Party of the National Council forwarded an interpellation on 
25 June 1998, raising the issue of the involvement of the Swiss National Bank in 
South Africa, but no discussion on the topic took place in the National Council. 
Through her initiative, Hollenstein and extra-parliamentary pressure groups (former 
anti-apartheid organisations and church groups) had hoped for a commission to be set 
62) See appendix 2 for an overview of the requests regarding South Africa made by Pia Hollenstein. 
63l Archivbestande und parlamentarische Vorsti:isse - Schweiz-Si.idafrika 1948-1994, 2000 : 98-102 . 
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up, similar to the Bergier Commission64) that investigated the cooperation between 
Switzerland and Nazi-Germany during the Second World War, but this was not to be. 
In a media release on 26 January 1999, the Legal Commission declared: 
Die Kommission (Rechtskommission des NR) ist der Auffassung, dass die 
Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und Stidafrika eingehend geprtift werden 
mtissen. Die Mehrheit der Kommission ist jedoch der Meinung, dass ihnen nicht 
dieselbe Bedeutung zukommt wie den Beziehungen der Schweiz wahrend des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges, so dass es unverhaltnismassig ware, eine entsprechende 
unabhangige Expertenkommission wie die Kommission Schweiz-Zweiter 
Weltkrieg einzusetzen. [The Commission (Legal Commission of the National 
Assembly) holds the view that the relations between Switzerland and South 
Africa should be thoroughly scrutinised. However, the majority of the 
Commission is of the opinion, that the same meaning is not applicable as for 
Swiss relations during the Second World War, so that it would be incongruous 
to appoint a corresponding independent Commission of Experts like the 
Commission Switzerland-Second World War.]65) 
Instead, the Swiss National Science Foundation was instructed to initiate and finance 
a research project in order ~o investigate political and business relations between 
Switzerland and South Africa during the apartheid era. The Federal Council, however, 
disallowed access to secret military and corporate archives (private archives were 
opened for the investigations of the Bergier Commission). Pfister (2000: 13) contends 
that during this initial period, the question of Swiss-South African relations was not 
yet regarded as a dominant political theme by the Swiss authorities or the media, and 
opponents lacked the necessary political clout to exercise greater pressure on the 
Federal Council. 
64) During the early 1990s, the Swiss banks and Swiss government came under heavy criticism for their 
collaboration in gold trade with Nazi Germany and for their refusal to pay restitution to the Nazi 
victims after the Second World War. It was especially pressure groups (from the politically and 
economically influential Jewish-American community) in the USA that led the way in "bashing 
Switzerland". In response, the Swiss government called on the Bergier Commission to investigate 
the allegations. The Federal Council also ruled that private archives should be opened for scrutiny. 
Through the successful class action lawsuits against the Swiss banks, American lawyers were able 
to force the banks to pay holocaust victims substantial amounts in restitution (Linder: 2000: 98). 
65 ) Communique to the media by the Legal Commission of the National Council, 26 January 1999. 
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With the launching of Jubilee 2000 South Africa - The Apartheid Debt and 
Reparations Campaign - in November 1998, a coalition of Swiss NGOs66) including 
the AAB Sudliches Afrika (the former AAM), and the Aktion Finanzplatz67 ), together 
with church-based68) organisations found a new means to exert political pressure on 
the Swiss government. Through their activities the coalition, Kampagne fur 
Entschuldung und Entschadigung in Sudlichen Afrika (KEESA), has succeeded in 
taking the campaign beyond a few civil society organisations to the level of a national 
debate - a debate that is still ongoing. These groups have been extremely active in 
doing extensive research69), participating in public debates and protest meetings, 
orgamsmg conferences, workshops, semmars, publishing related articles m 
newspapers and journals and holding public and media events. In addition, there has 
been considerable engagement with political leaders. In this regard, Hollenstein70) has 
committed herself in promoting the campaign of Jubilee 2000 South Africa at a 
national level, thus adding significant political weight to goals being pursued by the 
extra-parliamentary groups. 
Proponents of KEESA also believe that the coalition is sufficiently strong to bring its 
message to the Swiss public. During the apartheid era, the anti-apartheid organisations 
were significantly involved with the public, but their impact on the media and 
political parties in parliament was negligible. Considering this new debate, the 
coalition has been able to gain stronger support in the Swiss parliament and the 
66J See Appendix 3 for the Swiss partners of Jubilee 2000 South Africa. 
67l See www.aktionfinanzplatz.ch. 
68) See Appendix 3 for the interventions by the churches regarding the role of Swiss Banks in financing 
Apartheid. 
69J Apartheid Connections 1 - Odious Debts. Hinterlassenschaften der Diktatoren 
Apartheid Connections 2 - Diskrete Diplomatie als Alibi: Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik gegenuber 
der Apartheid, Zeitzeuginnen erinnern sich 
Apartheid Connections 3 - Entschiidigung ist ein Menschenrecht: Konzepte und Analysen zur 
Debatte um Wiedergutmachung bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen 
Apartheidschulden Der A nteil Deutsch/and und der Schweiz 
Forschungsreise in die Okonomie - Zwei sudafrikanische Konzerne in der Schweiz 
Kredite an Eskom - Ein Bespiel von Kollaboration mit dem Apartheidregime 
Chronologie Schweiz-Sudafrika 
70l In 2000, Pia Hollenstein together with other members of the National Council (Fulvio Pelli - FDP, 
Kathy Ricklin - CVP and Nils de Dardel - SP), fo1med a parliamentary group, aimed at keeping the 
theme of South Africa on the Swiss political agenda. The parliamentary group has a dual objective : 
firstly, it will continue to exercise pressure on the Federal Council regarding Swiss-South African 
relations during the apartheid era and secondly, it wants to play an active role in current relations 
between the two countries. In fulfilling its second objective, the group intends to meet with visitors 
from Southern African and to maintain contacts and exchange information with NGOs locally and 
in South Africa. 
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media. KEESA consists of several supporting organisations and its activities are 
coordinated by a coordination committee headed by Aktion Finanzplatz. In addition, a 
research group coordinated by Solifonds has been established to undertake 
independent research concerning past Swiss-South African relations. An additional 
strength of KEESA is that all the supporting organisations maintain independent links 
with South Africa. Thus Jubilee 2000 does not stand in isolation, but forms part of a 
greater Swiss NGO and church-based engagement in the country. 
Also noteworthy, is the increased media interest in this issue. Over the past five years, 
numerous articles in influential newspapers (in particular leading newspapers 
targeting the German-speaking population of Switzerland) have persistently brought 
the subject of Swiss-South African relations to the attention of the Swiss public. The 
apparent reluctance of the Swiss government to reach a full historical understanding 
of Switzerland's relations with the apartheid state, has been viewed in a very critical 
light by journalists71). 
Swiss journalists have also at times been instrumental in furthering the debate with 
their investigative journalism. The investigations of journalist Jean-Phillipe Ceppi into 
the military links between the Swiss and South African Intelligence Services and the 
subsequent airing of his documentary "Schweizer Spuren van Apartheid-Chemikern " 
on Temps Present (Swiss television station TSR) contributed to the intensification of 
the debate. Specifically the Division Head, Peter Regli was singled out as having had 
close links with Wouter Basson, who headed the biological and chemical weapons 
programme in South Africa ( Wochenzeitung, 29 April 1999). These new revelations 
in past Swiss-South African relations, not only brought the business ties under the 
spotlight, but also questioned the role of the Swiss military and Intelligence Service. 
Commenting on the controversy, the journalist Res Strehle of the Weltwoche ( 25 
March 1999) maintained: 
7
' l The following selection of newspaper articles include interviews with proponents from different 
groups and provide greater in-depth reporting on Swiss-South African relations during the apartheid 
era . 
Facts, 27 June 2002 ; Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 3-4 July 1999; Schweiz global, 1999/2; Sonntags 
Zeitung, 2 May 1999; Weltwoche, 26 November 1998; 25 March 1999, 8 April 1999, 22 November 
2001 , 6 December 2001 , 26 June 2002, 27 June 2002 ; WochenZeitung, 25 March 1999, 20 
December 2001. 
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Wenn die Geschichte des Schweizer Engagement am Kap nicht systematisch 
aufgearbeitet wird, bekommen wir sie in homoopatischen Dosen verabreicht. 
Aussitzen geht nicht: Gegenwartig ist der Chef der militarische Geheimdienstes 
dran. [ ... ] Wer ist der nachste? [If the story of the Swiss involvement in the Cape 
is not re-examined systematically, we will get it delivered in homeopathic 
dosages. Sitting out is not possible: Presently the head of the military 
Intelligence service is involved [ ... ] Who is next?] 
Of paramount importance to KEESA is that Switzerland must deal with its past and 
refrain from defending itself as being small and powerless within the international 
arena. Proponents in the coalition accuse Swiss companies of colluding with the 
South African government for profit. In addition, the Swiss companies also colluded 
with the Swiss government because by law companies had to be registered and supply 
annual reports indicating their profit structure. By maintaining a position of neutrality, 
Switzerland also had more leeway politically and economically. The coalition calls on 
the Swiss government and the Swiss business community to acknowledge their 
history with apartheid-South Africa and to deal with the past by providing financial 
support to the victims of apartheid. Furthermore, proponents from the coalition 
believe that once the Swiss government is engaged in the process of reparation, it can 
be ensured that history is not repeated (Interviews with Muller & Loebell-Ryan). 
5.3 THE RESPONSE BY THE SWISS BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
The overwhelming response to the accusations being levelled at the Swiss business 
community, has been that they saw no wrong-doing in their relations which were with 
South Africa. Business was conducted as usual72l. Accusations focus on the 
involvement of the Swiss banks in rescheduling South Africa's debt and providing 
credit during the mid-1980s and the refusal of Swiss corporations to disinvest and 
withdraw from the country as called for by economic sanctions. Jubilee 2000 South 
Africa and its supporters view these actions as having prolonged the reign of the 
72
> See also Thoni, F. 1988. Die sozio-politischen Strategien von schweizerischen, multinational 
!ndustrie-unternehmungen in Sudafrika for a description of the activities of Swiss multinationals in 
South Africa. 
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apartheid regime73l. Box 5.1 provides a brief summary of the mam points of 
contention. 
Box 5.1 
Propping up the apartheid government 
Rescheduling of debt74) 
In the mid-1980s South Atrica was faced with a financial crisis that led to the 
government unilaterally declaring a moratorium on foreign debt. Fritz Leutwiler, the 
former President of the Swiss National Bank, played a leading role during the first 
round of negotiations for the rescheduling of short-term loans and acted as 
intermediary between the South African government and the commercial banks 
concerned. Between 1986 and 1993, four interim debt agreements were concluded 
with the creditor banks including Credit Suisse, UBS and Swiss Bank Corporation 
(today UBS). There are no known figures concerning the precise proportion of debts 
owed to Swiss banks, but they were collectively listed as the fifth largest creditor 
behind their counterparts in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
Luxembourg and France. Th" rescheduling of debt irked anti-apartheid organisations, 
because banks did not take heed of their calls to lay down specific political conditions 
so that the apartheid government could be forced to the negotiations table. 
A study prepared by Madorin, Wellmer and Egli cites the total of R50 billion 
(approximately CHF 12.5 billion) as South African debt arising from the apartheid 
era. According to the study of the interdepartmental working group, this is a matter of 
considerable contention. The working group states that the organisers of Jubilee 2000 
have chosen a very broad definition that incorporates debts at the local and provincial 
levels, as well as those on the part of government and semi-government institutions. 
They appear to have included certain equities held by investors abroad. The South 
African government stated that public debt from the apartheid era only amounted to 
73l Die Burger, 3 July 1998 ; Beeld, 18 June 1999 ; The Citizen, 11 May 2000. 
74l The Sunday Star, 15 September 1985; Weekly Mail, 21 August 1986; The New Nation, 19 October 
1989. 
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R235.8 million (CHF 60 million) of the total national debts of approximately R300 
billion (CHF 75 billion). 75l 
The role of gold76) 
South Africa's important position as the leading gold producing country in the world, 
provided the initial link between Swiss big banks and South Africa. In the 1950s gold 
constituted 50% of South Africa's world exports and in the 1970s South Africa 
contributed 80% of world gold production. During the international currency crisis 
that saw the temporary closure of the London market in 1968, the three big Swiss 
banks seized the opportunity and founded the Zurich gold pool taking over the 
marketing of the newly-mined gold from the world's two largest suppliers, South 
Africa and the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, Zurich accounted for three quarters of 
the share of South African gold sales, this figure being reduced to between 50%-60% 
in 1980. Zurich was to become the most important market for gold trading for ten 
years. 
The gold boom between 1960 and 1980 (gold increased from $35 per ounce to $850 
per ounce in 1979) and the move by South African mining houses to deep level 
mining (with mine shafts dropping to 4000 meters at a temperature of 70° Celsius) 
created ample opportunities for Swiss firms to get involved in the gold industry. Vital 
industries like cement and steel plants, electricity (particularly ESKOM, a major 
recipient of Swiss investment funding) and water works, as well as the construction of 
infrastructure, paved the way for Swiss companies like Brown Boveri, Elektrowatt, 
Motor Columbus, Holderbank, Sulzer and Schindler Lifts to benefit from the 
industrialisation around mining concerns. The big banks and insurance companies 
also followed to provide the necessary credit and insurance. 
75l Interdepartmental Working Group, Switzerland - South Africa 1999; HEKS report; See www.sacc-
ct.org.za/ j2ksa/contents.htmI for a translation of the Madorin et al. report. 
76) Eggstein, Interview, Contribution to the HOLCIM commemorative volume; Rand Daily Mail, 27 
December 1980. 
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In countering the attacks, business leaders77) (all members of the Swiss-South African 
Association) have contended that the Swiss business community seized the 
opportunity to do business in South Africa. They emphasise that South Africa was 
important for its raw materials and its geo-political positioning - it was an ally to the 
western nations against communism. Business leaders deny that the demise of 
apartheid could have been expedited by multinational corporations withdrawing from 
South Africa and banks not providing credit, arguing that such actions would have led 
to greater unemployment, famine and social chaos. Furthermore, the apartheid 
apparatus had at its disposal a loyal military and any forceful unseating of the 
government would have led to a brutal civil war. In addition, due to the Cold War, 
South Africa was also able to muster support from powerful western nations. Given 
this political scenario, Eggstein concludes that no realistic expectation would have 
foreseen a successful assault on the apartheid regime in the mid-1980s. Saager also 
comments on the biased reporting by certain Swiss newspapers implying that Swiss 
corporations were profiteering during apartheid. He is critical of their stance "Wir 
sind die Guten und die Vertreter der Wirtschaft sind die Bosen." ["We are the good 
ones and the representatives of business are the bad ones"]. Saager welcomes the 
national research programme on Swiss-South African relations and he hopes that it 
will show the investments the Swiss business community made in supporting essential 
infrastructure in South Africa (Interviews with Eggstein & Schraf1)78>. 
5.4 STUDIES/INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SWISS 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
5.4.1 The Interdepartmental Working Group 
The Swiss government, in view of the ongoing interest in the topic, decided to re-
assess relations between Switzerland and South Africa during the apartheid era. The 
first study which was launched in March 1999, called on an interdepartmental 
77l Business leaders who are referred to in this section include Dr Anton Schrafl (Vice-President of 
Holderbank), Dr Pio Eggstein (former representative of Credit Suisse), Hansjtirg Saager (son of 
Bruno M Saager, the fust general director of SBG in South Africa and founding member of the 
SSAA) and Nikolaus Senn (Honorary President of UBS). 
78) Cash, 28 June 2002; Schweizer Jllustrierte, 24 June 2002; South Africa Bulletin, 5 May 1999; See 
also Der Staatsbiirger, for an interview with Dr Schrafl concerning the presence of Swiss 
companies in South Africa during the 1980s. 
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working group 79) to examine the legal and political context in which the relations 
between the two countries unfolded, as well as to review the behaviour of other 
countries during the period concerned. The interdepartmental working group had a 
limited mandate and the report did not deal with certain contentious issues such as the 
relations between the Swiss Intelligence Service and South African agencies and 
representatives. In addition, information was gleaned from existing federal 
government files without consulting federal or other external archives. 
In its general remarks, the report concludes that given the political climate of the Cold 
War Era, Switzerland's stance towards South Africa was understandable. However, in 
a changing international arena with the policy of neutrality being applied in a more 
flexible manner, such a cautious stance, especially regarding economic sanctions, 
would no longer be justified. The report's findings provided a good economic 
overview of Swiss-South African relations, but failed to contribute to a greater 
understanding of Swiss foreign policy in the political sphere. Even though the report 
only touched the surface of many areas, it was useful in formulating leading questions 
and reinforcing the need for a greater study to examine the complexity of the themes 
concerning Swiss-South African relations (Interview with Hollenstein)80). 
5.4.2 The National Research Programme 42+ 
Following the report of the interdepartmental working group and after the successful 
passing of a postulate in the Swiss parliament, the Federal Government instructed the 
Swiss National Science Foundation in May 2000 to add a supplementary module to 
the already existing National Forschungsprogramm 42 (NFP 42), "Foundation and 
79l DF A/Centre for Analysis and Prospective Studies 
DF A/Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
DF A/Directorate for International Law 
DF A/Economic and Financial Division 
DFAIPD II 
Federal Department of Home Affairs/Swiss Federal Archive 
Federal Department of Finance/Federal Finance Administration 
Federal Department of Justice and Police/Office of the Federal Prosecutor 
Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications/ General Secretariat 
Federal Department of Defence , Civil Protection and Sport 
Federal Department of Economic Affairs 
Federal Office of Foreign Trade 
Swiss National Bank 
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Possibilities of Swiss Foreign Policy". The additional module, NFP42+, was to focus 
specifically on Swiss relations with South Africa during the apartheid years. The 
research programme NFP42+ was allocated a modest budget of CHF 2 million and 
has a duration of two years with the date of completion being the end of 2003. This 
was the second time that the Federal Council had taken such a step, the first being for 
the research concerning the role of Switzerland during the Second World War. The 
principal goal of the NFP 42+ is to develop a scientific basis for assessing 
Switzerland's policy towards South Africa by focusing on a small number of 
coordinated research projects which are by nature multidisciplinary oriented. Special 
consideration was given to issues in the following domains: 
1. The economic domain - the impact of sanctions on Switzerland and South 
Africa; 
2. The legal domain - the compatibility of neutrality, the interest of business and 
human rights; 
3. The political domain - the interaction between officials m Berne, as well 
extra-parliamentary groups; 
4. The historical domain - the image of Switzerland domestically and 
internationally. 
The ten projects approved within the framework of the research programme included 
the following themes: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The Economic relations between Switzerland and South Africa, 1945-1990 
Switzerland and South Africa under Apartheid: the idea of development 
South Africa Policy in the UN System and in Switzerland 
Swiss-South African relationships during apartheid in public political 
communications 
Designing a Swiss-South African image in the Federal Administration 
Legal Room for Manoeuvre in Swiss Foreign Policy against states that violate 
international law 
Perception and opinion forming in Swiss Foreign Policy 
Effects of Sanctions during apartheid - the role of Switzerland 
The Coherence of Swiss Policy toward South Africa 
soi Interdepartmental Working Group: Switzerland-South Africa, July 1999; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2 
October 1999. 
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• Designing Swiss-South African relations - A Comparison across time 
Although opponents laud the NFP 42+ as a "step in the right direction" and the lifting 
of the 30 year moratorium on the states archives is welcomed81 \ the research 
programme is not without criticism. Guhl (Die Weltwoche, 5 October 2000) points out 
that the leader of the NFP 42 research programme and designated leader for the NFP 
42+ programme, Prof Jiirg Gabriel from the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology, 
resigned out of protest because the authorities in Berne were impeding any 
comprehensive analysis with their reluctance to demand that banks and private 
companies open their archives for scientific scrutiny. In doing so, the Federal Council 
had spared the business sector the task of opening up the past and promoting a process 
of transparency. Furthermore, the NFP42+ only targets Swiss researchers (or persons 
with close links to Switzerland), thus providing an additional drawback as the 
research expertise available in Switzerland on this topic is limited. In the introduction 
of the NFP42+ information booklet, Prof Georg Kreis, the leader of the NFP42+ 
states that "[it] would certainly have been desirable if the South African research 
forces could have been engaged to a greater extent on a simultaneous on-site 
companion study of Swiss policy on South Africa". 
The concerns of Gabriel are echoed by KEESA and parliamentary groups. To counter 
the exclusion of many local and South African organisations in this process, an 
independent research group, coordinated by Solifonds, was formed. Together with 
South African partners, the research group intends to maintain the pressure on the 
NFP42+ research programme. Guhl, however, also points out that the areas under 
investigation are essentially harmless. He expresses the fear (also cited by officials in 
the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) that no new findings will come to light 
and that answers to many of the questions are already known, thus rendering the 
research programme as potentially redundant. Muller, a junior researcher on the 
project "Perception and opimon forming in Swiss Foreign Policy" and an independent 
researcher for the Afrika Komitee maintains that even if no new findings are found, it 
is important that the story of Swiss-South African relations during the apartheid era be 
81l The moratorium excludes any files of the Intelligence service. 
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repeated, but this time based on scholarly research. In her opinion, the stamp of 
scientific research validation is important in furthering the debate on the issue. 
5.4.3 Investigations regarding the alleged cooperation between the Swiss 
Intelligence Service and South Africa 
After the revelations of Jean-Philippe Ceppi and the findings of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission indicating that links existed between the Swiss 
intelligence service and their counterparts in South Africa, the head of the Swiss 
Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, Federal Councillor Adolf 
Ogi, on 20 March 1999 called for an investigation concerning the relations between 
the intelligence service and foreign intelligence agencies since 1960. Although Swiss-
South African links were only part of the study, it was mainly this controversy that 
triggered the investigation. As Division Head of the Intelligence Service, Peter Regli 
was instructed to order the files concerning this matter and to hand the relevant 
information over to the Military Archives. After an investigation regarding Regli 's 
alleged links with South Africa's apartheid regime, he was cleared of any wrong-
doing. In addition, Regli was declared as "fully rehabilitated" on 2 December 1999. 
The final report remained highly confidential and was not even at the disposal of high 
ranking officials in the Swiss authorities. 
Simultaneously, a delegation of the Public Procedures Control Commission of the 
Swiss Parliament also initiated an investigation on 17 March 1999. The investigation 
focused on the connection between the Swiss Intelligence Service and especially Peter 
Regli's links with the apartheid regime. The alleged help given by the Swiss 
Intelligence Service for the building up of the biological and chemical weapons 
programme (B and C weapons programme) in South Africa, was also highlighted. As 
part of its investigations, the Commission also questioned Peter Regli. In reporting on 
its findings on 1 December 1999, the Commission criticised the fact that Regli had 
been given permission to destroy certain intelligence files, but could not find any 
incriminating information connecting him to Wouter Basson. For the Federal 
Department of Defence and the Public Procedures Control Commission the 
investigations had been concluded. 
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Peter Regli was sent into early retirement in March 2000, but he was not to disappear 
quietly from the public arena. During the course of 2001, Wouter Basson made new 
revelations implicating Peter Regli as an accomplice in support of the apartheid 
regime. He maintained that Regli had full knowledge of the B and C weapons 
programme in South Africa, allegations that were denied by Regli . Spurned on by 
these new allegations, KEESA ensured that Regli was again in the public arena. With 
new evidence coming to the fore, Federal Councillor Samuel Schmid from the Federal 
Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports ordered a second investigation to 
be done by the Federal Administration into relations between the Swiss intelligence 
service and South Africa. This investigation had to clarify the alleged existence of an 
agreement between Switzerland and South Africa concerning B and C weapons, as 
well as the questions regarding the intelligence files that were destroyed by Regli. 
Running parallel to this investigation, the Public Procedures Control Commission was 
once again re-activated, with the same goal as in 1999. In announcing the follow-up 
investigation, the leader of the Commission stated that the first report contained many 
unanswered questions. In view of the new allegations, it was hoped that with further 
investigations in Switzerland, as well as South Africa, the full extent of cooperation 
could be established82>. 
In March 2002, representatives from the Federal Administration and the Federal 
Police visited South Africa to examine intelligence files concerning the illegal trade of 
arms and to question relevant persons, including former high-ranking South African 
officials. The Swiss officials were unable to question Wouter Basson, as he was still 
embroiled in legal proceedings in the South African high court (Tagesblatt, 3 April 
2002). In July 2002 Advocate Ackermann, the prosecutor in the Basson case 
addressed the Commission (SonntagsZeitung, 16 June 2002). Investigations, however, 
face difficulties as the work of the Intelligence Service is covert and agreements or 
cooperation are not necessari!y written down. Furthermore, the relevant investigative 
82) Berner Zeitung, 12 September 2001; Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 13 August 2001 , 13 November 2001 ; 
Tages-Anzeiger, 27 August 2001 , 11 September 2001 , 24 September 2001 , 13 November 2001, 1 
December 2001 ; WochenZeitung, 4 October 2001. See Media Communiques by the Department of 
Federal Defence, Civil Protection and Sport on 17 September 1999, March 2000, November 2001, 
March 2000 at www.admin.ch. 
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bodies are aware that Regli most probably destroyed any relevant or incriminating 
files. The investigations continue. 
5.5 THE RESPONSE BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
The South African government (to the relief of the Swiss authorities) has regarded the 
ongoing debate concerning Switzerland's relations with South Africa during the 
apartheid era as an internal issue. Both President Mbeki and Minister Nkosazana 
Zuma indicated that the South African government will not participate in this 
domestic matter. The calls by Jubilee 2000 South Africa for debt cancellation and 
reparations have also not received official support. The South African government, 
fears that debt cancellation will affect the country's credit rating negatively, thus 
risking higher interest rates. Taking into consideration this position on debt 
cancellation, the Federal Council responded to the interpellation submitted by the 
Social Democratic Party faction on 1 March 1999, stating that it did not deem it 
necessary to enter into talks concerning a cancellation of debt. There has also been a 
struggle to increase the levels of foreign direct investment in South Africa. 
Unfortunately, the international attention that was focused on the country in 1994 did 
not necessary translate into substantial flows of new investment. Any action which is 
likely to discourage potential investors, is now considered as contra-productive. This 
includes opposing the big banks and corporations. 
The alleged contact between Wouter Basson and Peter Regli , the former head of 
Swiss Intelligence, on collaboration in the field of biological and chemical weapons, 
does not feature as an issue on President Mbeki's agenda during his meetings with the 
Swiss authorities. It is evident that the South African government under the leadership 
of President Mbeki does not want to venture into the past, but has a pragmatic and 
economic oriented view regarding future relations with Switzerland. Furthermore, the 
stance of the South African Embassy in Switzerland is to take note of the ongoing 
debate, but there is no intention of becoming actively involved in this matter 
(Interview with Basson)83 ) . 
83) Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 13 October 1999; Tages-Anzeiger, 13 October 1999. 
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In commenting on the South African government's reaction to the calls by Jubilee 
2000 South Africa and the continuing pressure being placed on the Swiss government 
and business community, both Muller and Loebell-Ryan state that the diplomatic 
aloofuess displayed by the South African authorities is not viewed as unusual. As an 
emerging economy, South Africa is struggling to increase its levels of foreign direct 
investment. In addition, the country must deal with the vulnerabilities of the global 
economy and world markets . It is therefore understandable that South Africa's stance 
will be noticeably cautious. IIowever, they also emphasise that the debate should not 
only be reduced to economics. A broader perspective, comprising the right of 
apartheid victims to be given compensation, should be included in the Swiss-South 
African agenda. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
The renewed interest vis-a-vis the relations between Switzerland and South Africa 
during the apartheid era, has seen members of parliament, non-governmental 
organisations, churches and members of the media, joining forces in order to exercise 
increased pressure on the Swiss government, banks and business to deal with the issue 
of apartheid debt and reparations . Jubilee 2000 South Africa has given this internal 
debate an external dimension, while also uniting former anti-apartheid organisations. 
These well established ties have proved to be very beneficial in rallying support for 
their new cause. Additional leverage has also been achieved by gaining the support of 
members of parliament. 
With the South African government distancing itself from Jubilee 2000 South Africa, 
the Swiss government has not deemed it necessary to take any drastic actions in 
investigating Swiss-South African relations during the apartheid era. In addition, the 
Swiss business community has viewed calls for reparation as "absurd" and companies 
have been reluctant to take any official stance on the matter. However, the threat of 
legal proceedings in the form of class-action lawsuits for apartheid debt cancellation 
and reparations may force them out of their inaction. Leading American lawyers Ed 
Fagan and Michael Hausfeld (both participated in successful class-action lawsuits 
against Swiss banks on behalf of holocaust survivors) have agreed to help the victims 
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of apartheid to force corporations that aided and abetted the apartheid regime to pay 
compensation 84). 
The possibility of American lawyers entering the fray, has brought both advantages 
and disadvantages for the campaign led by KEESA. The greatest advantage has been 
that the media has given the campaign extensive coverage, thus the Swiss public has 
been kept informed of the ongoing debate and the Swiss government and business 
community have been forced to take the matter seriously. The drawback has been that 
the sensationalism of the headlines has often detracted from the main themes of the 
debate. To counter these negative effects, KEESA has opted to maintain its focus on 
documenting the past and then bringing it to the attention of the Swiss media, 
government and the public. 
In summmg up the current debate, Urs Sekinger, Coordinator of the Solifonds, 
contends that central to this political debate is the conflict between proponents who 
support a moralistic foreign policy guided by the protection of universal human rights 
and proponents who promote a foreign policy based on an export-orientated economy. 
With Switzerland's immense dependence on foreign trade, the business sector and 
Swiss foreign trade policy ha.ve maintained the upper hand in directing Swiss foreign 
policy. It can, therefore, be stated that business dominated in what were essentially 
political issues. However, in the Post-Cold War era, the protection of human rights 
has emerged as an important prerequisite for engaging in international relations. A 
shift of emphasis away from exports, can strengthen the hand of those in Switzerland 
who support a values-oriented foreign policy. 
84) Facts, 27 June 2002; Tages-Anzeiger, 19 June 2002, 20 June 2002 ; Weltwoche, 27 June 2002. 
Wochenzeitung, 20 June 2002 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
In Chapter One it was stated that the research aim of this study is to analyse - i.e. to 
describe and explain - Swiss-South African relations from 1994 to 2001. The research 
was undertaken within the framework of the pluralist paradigm which takes 
cognisance of the fact that actors in the international system mobilise support around 
a wide variety issues. Thu~ a multi-actor (state and non-state actors), multi-level 
(domestic, national and international) and multi-issue framework was used to describe 
and explain Swiss-South African relations. 
The study was deemed necessary as no comprehensive research has been undertaken 
in South Africa regarding the subject matter in question. The following questions 
were posed as part of the research problem. 
1. What role did the political regime of Switzerland play regarding foreign policy 
formulation? 
2. What are the important remits or conceptions that can be viewed as directing 
Swiss foreign policy? 
3. How did Switzerland's position in the world economy affect its position and 
foreign policy towards South Africa? 
4. What role did state and non-state actors play in the development of relations 
between Switzerland and South Africa? 
In Chapter Two, it was shown that the distinct political regime of Switzerland has 
been instrumental in shaping the foreign policy of the country. The interplay between 
internal and external politics must be emphasised if Swiss foreign policy formulation 
is to be understood. Constitutionalised political institutions such as federalism, a 
government of concordance and direct democracy have been vital in determining 
Swiss foreign policy. Furthermore, policy makers must take into account the two 
cornerstones guiding foreign policy, namely the principles of sovereignty and 
neutrality. These are two features which are firmly rooted in the Swiss political 
culture. 
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In conducting international relations with other states, internal and external factors 
had to be considered. Internally, Switzerland recognised that it is a small entity, 
politically powerless and extremely dependent on foreign trade. Externally, the 
bipolar international system which emerged after the Second World War, was a 
further contributing factor in Switzerland's foreign relations. During the Cold War 
era, Switzerland was constantly striving to affirm the role that neutral powers could 
play in easing tensions across the East-West divide. By adhering to a policy of 
neutrality in world politics, the Swiss were regarded as dependable trustees and 
negotiators and could gain a significant amount of quiet leverage It can be stated that 
postwar Swiss foreign policy can be characterised as neutralite engagee or neutrally 
engaged. 
It is also this East-West divide which provided the backdrop for Swiss-South African 
relations. In Chapter Three, it was noted that relations with South Africa were based 
on both strategic imperatives and economic necessity. Geopolitically, the country was 
a strategic partner in the fight against communism and economically South Africa was 
identified as a country rich in raw materials . With Switzerland's adherence to a 
foreign policy based on sovereignty and neutrality (including important aspects such 
as non-interference in domestic affairs and non-compliance with economic sanctions) 
and its trade policy encouraging close economic cooperation, South Africa could 
benefit from having links with a reputable western nation. Furthermore, the Swiss 
government was not convinced that isolating the apartheid regime politically or 
economically would result in bringing about the domestic changes needed in South 
Africa. During the apartheid era, it can be noted that neither economic nor political 
relations were scaled down between the two countries. After the first democratic 
elections in South Africa in 1994, Switzerland remained one of South Africa's most 
important western supporters and present-day relations between the two countries are 
described in official communiques as extremely good and very cordial. 
The role and interaction of state and non-state actors in Swiss-South African relations 
has also been significant. In Chapters Three to Five, the activities of these actors were 
described both during the apartheid era and during the transition period of South 
Africa's new democratic society. Chapters Three and Five have a common theme, 
Switzerland's relations with the apartheid regime. However, the difference between 
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the two chapters lies in the fact that the new debate follows a decade during which the 
Swiss government and banks were forced to deal with their Nazi connections 50 years 
after the end of the Second World War. Internationally, the good, "clean" governance 
image which Switzerland had always portrayed, was tarnished and the integrity of the 
Swiss questioned. Furthermore, in contrast with pre-1994, the relations were dissected 
critically and publicly and received greater media and political attention. 
Taking into consideration he vanous state actors who played a role in the 
development of Swiss-South African relations, it is clear from Chapter Three that the 
apartheid regime had sufficient support amongst the members of the Swiss Federal 
Assembly, Federal Council, the diplomatic representatives and state officials, to avoid 
being marginalized. Although the Swiss government condemned apartheid morally, 
discreet diplomacy was still the preferred line to follow. In addition, the Swiss 
government did not deem it necessary to dictate to the Swiss business community 
how to conduct its business relations in South Africa. 
Chapter Four described the various domains where official relations have been forged 
between the two countries since 1994. Within all the domains described - diplomacy, 
economy, development cooperation and culture - South Africa maintained a 
significant position and has received substantial financial support from Switzerland. 
However, certain Swiss NGOs question their government's motives, cautioning that 
Swiss government aid could merely be a pseudo-moral justification of what is in fact 
support for Swiss business relations with South Africa. The NGOs maintain that the 
Swiss government turned a blind eye to the gross human rights abuses committed 
under apartheid, and that development aid is not sufficient to rectify the wrongs of the 
past. 
When referring to the role of non-state actors in the development of relations between 
Switzerland and South Africa, it is the Swiss business community that often provided 
the platform for both economic and political relations during the apartheid era. In 
Chapter Three it was shown that economic support for South Africa continued 
unabated and even escalated during a period when other western nations were 
applying economic sanctions and disinvesting. The perception exists that "White 
South Africa" appealed to the Swiss people, and the business community saw it as 
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their task not only to nurture commercial links, but also to ensure that western 
civilisation became firmly grounded in South Africa. 
Viewing current business relations, non-state actors such as the Swiss-South African 
Association, the Swiss Business Council and the Swiss-South African Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, continue to forge close economic links between the two 
countries. Many of Switzerland's most important corporations are established in 
South Africa and the Charr_Jer of Commerce and Industry is helping SMEs and 
SMMEs to enter the respective markets. In addition, the South African Trade attache 
based at the South African Embassy in Berne, has also targeted foreign direct 
investment as a top priority. For South Africa to benefit fully from all the efforts made 
on these different fronts, the various bodies should strive towards greater cooperation 
and sharing of knowledge and information. 
The former anti-apartheid organisations are the final group of non-state actors who 
have played a significant role in highlighting relations between Switzerland and South 
Africa. Like the presence of the Swiss business community in South Africa, these 
organisations have also been on the political scene for several decades. However, in 
contrast to the tacit support which the business community gave the apartheid regime, 
these organisations were lobbying for the fall of the South African government. The 
anti-apartheid organisations, were not able wield sufficient influence to change the 
Swiss government's policy towards South Africa. However, with the new debate 
regarding Swiss-South African relations unfolding, the coalition of organisations 
supporting Jubilee 2000 South Africa, KEESA, as well as the campaign's supporters 
in the Swiss parliament, have touched a moral nerve. Should the black majority in 
South Africa pay a second time for apartheid? They claim that the cancellation of 
apartheid debt and reparation for the victims of apartheid by the Swiss government 
and Swiss business community, are necessary to address the continuing injustice. 
Currently, the prominence which the apartheid theme has maintained in Switzerland, 
still raises many unanswered questions. Firstly, despite the launching of the National 
Research Programme 42+, NGOs are questioning whether the whole truth about past 
Swiss-South African relations will be revealed. Secondly, it is unclear how the Swiss 
government intends to use the research being undertaken within the ten research 
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projects and what actions will be taken in the future. Thirdly, by disallowing 
researchers access to the files of the secret service and private sector (big banks and 
corporations), the Swiss authorities are accused by opponents of a "cover-up". During 
the apartheid era, it was the anti-apartheid organisations that kept the Swiss 
government informed of the human rights violations in South Africa. Through 
independent investigations and research, KEESA continues to bring the "Apartheid 
Connections" to the attention of the Swiss government, media and public. 
As stated earlier, this study provides a framework which will give the reader a better 
understanding of the wide and diverse scope of interactions between Switzerland and 
South Africa and the foreign policies which have guided the relations between the two 
countries. This thesis can, however, also be regarded as an initial introduction to the 
Swiss-South Africa theme, thus paving the way for more in-depth studies. In the 
problem statement it was stated that there is currently a lack of information 
concerning this subject in South Africa. South African researchers, therefore, need to 
mirror the research that has already been done by their Swiss counterparts regarding 
Swiss-South African relations by scrutinising relevant documents from the South 
African Archives, State Departments and private sources. As most of the research 
produced in Switzerland is either in German or French, it would be useful if regular 
studies were undertaken to provide at least translated summaries highlighting the 
main findings of these studies. This will not only provide a more complete picture of 
Swiss-South African relations, but could also contribute and support the formulation 
of foreign policy regarding Switzerland. 
In examining past and present Swiss-South African relations, the reader can also learn 
to appreciate the delicate space available to South Africa's diplomatic representatives 
in Switzerland for political manoeuvring. They have to navigate Swiss-South African 
relations taking into consideration the current debate and the tensions existing 
between the different groups. Crucial in walking this fine line is that diplomatic 
representatives must assess the different protagonists involved, come to understand 
their philosophy and then strategise the position South Africa should maintain 
considering all the different points of view. Ultimately, state and non-state actors in 
Switzerland would like to assist South Africa (and are already actively involved in 
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South Africa) in its reconstruction process and it would be deconstructive to fuel 
antagonism between the opposing groups. 
Unlike the apartheid era and the transitional period following the first democratic 
elections, South Africa is no longer the focal point of international interest. Despite 
the continued efforts in creating opportunities to maintain world attention (e.g. the 
profile of President Mbeki as a leading figure on the African continent and the 
country as a centre for international conferences), South Africa must not rest on its 
laurels, as many developing countries are vying for the attention of industrialised 
nations. For decades Switzerland has been a keen supporter of South Africa. The 
question can be posed whether Switzerland's attitude towards South Africa will 
harden if the country fails in its efforts to become a fully-fledged democracy and the 
government is incapable of leading the majority of the country's people to greater 
prosperity. The South African government must, therefore, constantly strive for good 
governance based on the rule of law, maintain a healthy economy by implementing 
sound and stable macro-economic policies and tackle the social problems facing the 
country (especially crime and HIV/AIDS) with urgency and conviction. Creating and 
maintaining a stable environment and narrowing the gap between the "haves" and 
"have-nots" is the key to guarding South Africa's status as the gateway to Africa. 
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Appendix 1 
SDC Partners in South Africa 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Black Sash 
Board of Sheriffs, Department of Justice 
Border Rural Committee (BRC) 
Catholic Education A id Programme (CEAP) 
Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) 
Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 
Department of Land Affairs/KZN (DLA) 
Eastern Cape Transformation Authority (ECTA) 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) 
Environmental and Development Trust (EDA) 
Human Rights Commission, Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign 
Human Rights Trust (HR T) 
Ikwezi Whole School Development Project 
Institute for Democracy South Africa (IDASA) 
Institute of Training and Education for Capacity Building (ITEC) 
Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) 
Legal Resources Centre (LRS) 
Media in Education Trust (MIET) 
National Land Committee (NLC) 
Nelson Mandela Municipality 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) 
Provincial Affairs and Intergovernmental Relations Institute (PAIR) 
Swiss-South African Cooperation Initiative (SSACI) 
Amsai Primary School 
Bahloki Steelpoort Unemployment Association 
Forest Town Foundation 
Furntrain 
Outward Bound 
Siyavuka Lateral Improvement Foundation 
Youth Empowerment Network 
• South African Institute for Distance Education (SAIDE) 
• Southern Cape Land Committee Trust (SCLCT) 
• UNDP - Department of Justice 
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Appendix 2 
Parliamentary demands85J by National Councillor, Pia Hollenstein (Year, procedural 
form, demand) 
2002 
Question hour 
Reactivation of the interdepartmental group Switzerland/South Africa 
Question hour 
Complete transparency regarding the statements m South Africa concerning 
Switzerland 
2001 
Parliamentary initiative 
Public procedures control Commission. Intelligence service and Apartheid 
Question Hour 
Peter Regli. Investigation. Information from South Africa 
Question Hour 
Peter Regli. Access to sources for the investigation 
ssi Source: www.parlament.ch, see Demands and Definitions. 
Parliamentary initiative 
The "right of initiative" enables a member to submit a rough draft of a constitutional article, law or 
decree or to propose in general terms that such a text be drafted . 
Interpellation 
"Interpellation" enables the members of Parliament to request information on events or problems 
relating to foreign or domestic policy or administration. Interpellation can be designated as urgent. 
The Council can resolve on further discussion. 
Ordinary question 
A miniature version of an interpellation, the "ordinary question" can be used to request explanations 
on a federal issue. The Federal Council must provide a written answer to such questions before the 
session following the one during which the question was submitted. 
Question Hour (only National Council) 
At the beginning of the second and third week of each session, the Federal Council give oral 
answers to the questions submitted by the National Councillors in writing the preceding week. 
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Interpellation 
Switzerland/South Africa. When will the information be forthcoming? 
Ordinary question 
NFP42+. Part Swiss-South Africa 
Ordinary question 
Transparency regarding the statements in South Africa concerning Switzerland 
2000 
Question hour 
Official position of the Federal Council regarding Namibia in the mid-1960s to 1980s 
Ordinary question 
Executive committee of the NFP study comm1ss10n to re-examme Swiss/South 
African relations 
1999 
Question Hour 
Dubious archiving command to Peter Regli 
Interpellation 
Federal archive. Files of the Federal Department of Defence 
Interpellation 
Relations between Switzerland/South Africa. Access to the sources of the Intelligence 
service 
Interpellation 
Exchange of pilots with South Africa. Judgement 
Ordinary question 
Stay of officials in South Africa, 1948 to 1994 
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Ordinary question 
Investigation of relations between Switzerland and South Africa. Constitutional 
questions 
1998 
Parliamentary initiative 
Re-examining relations between Switzerland and South Africa during the years 1948-
1994 
1997 
Ordinary question 
Switzerland should explain its relations with South Africa 
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Appendix 3 
Swiss partner organisations of Jubilee 2000 South Africa 
• AAB Stidliches Afrika 
• Afrika-Komitee 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz 
Centrale Sanitaire Suisse, Regionalsektion deutschsprachige Schweiz 
Centre Europe Tiers Monde CETIM 
Comite pour l'annulation de la dette du tiers monde CADTM 
CO-OPERAID 
Erklarung von Bern I Declaration de Berne 
Fonds fur Entwicklung und Partnerschaft in Afrika FEPA 
Forum fur Friedenserziehung 
Freundeskreis Schweiz-Zambia 
Schweizerisches Arbeiterlnnenhilfswerk SAR 
Solifonds 
Terre des Hommes Schweiz 
Terre des Hommes Suisse 
Verein Solidaritat mit Moc;ambique 
Vereinigung Schweiz-Zimbabwe 
Church-based organisations 
• Bethlehem Mission Immensee 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Bundeschlussgruppe der Petrus-Gemeinde Bern 
Brot fur alle 
Commission Tiers Monde de l'Eglise catholique COTMEC 
DM echange et mission 
Fachstelle OeME Bern 
Gerechtigkeit, Frieden und Bewahrung der Schopfung der OeME St.Gallen 
Groupe Eglise-Nouvelle Afrique du Sud 
Groupe Volontaires Outre-Mer GVOM 
Hilfswerk Evangelischer Kirchen der Schweiz HEKS 
I eunesse etudiante chretienne a Geneve JEC 
Jeunesses alternatives genevoises 
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• Mission 21 - Evangelisches Missionswerk Basel 
• Laienmissionarinnen 
• Mission der Briidergemeine 
• OeME St.Gallen I Thurgau I Appenzell 
• OeME und Bundesschlussgruppe Thumen 
• Pain pour le prochain 
• Pax Christi Suisse 
• Siidafrika-Mission SAM 
• Table ronde Afrique australe du conseil missionnaire catholique, Fribourg 
• Theologische Bewegung :fiir Solidaritat und Befreiung 
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Appendix 4 
Church Interventions Regarding the Role of Swiss Banks in Financing Apartheid 86) 
15.06.1999 Jubilee 2000 South Africa delegation meets Swiss government officials 
and parliamentarians regarding apartheid debt cancellation and 
reparations 
13.10.1999 Open letter t0 Swiss President regarding apartheid debt cancellation 
and reparations for the peoples of Southern Africa 
07.05.2000 Visit of Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane, Anglican Archbishop of 
Cape Town87) and Mr Neville Gabriel, National Secretary of Jubilee 
2000 SA. Various public meetings were addressed and meetings were 
held with: 
• Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs 
• Churches 
• Parliamentarians 
• Swiss Campaign for Apartheid Debt Cancellation & 
Reparations 
• NGOs 
• World Council of Churches 
March 2001 Swiss Lenten Campaign theme "Money Needs a New Note", South 
African apartheid debt cancellation and reparations as a theme with 
Neville Gabriel as a guest speaker. 
86) Source: HEKS. 
87) Tages-Anzeiger, 13 May 2000; Die Weltwoche, 11 May 2000. 
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